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When Law Risks Madness
Susan P Koniak

I. Introduction
Within the United States in 1996, there is a community scattered
among us with its own law, its own courts and its own well-armed militias. While the existence of these militias has prompted some debate in
the legal literature, the community's law and its courts have been
ignored.' That law rejects the power of the courts of the federal government and those of the states over the "Sovereign Citizens" of this separate
community. On the other hand, this community claims jurisdiction over
us - should we interfere with its citizens in some way proscribed by its
law - and over those we recognize as our judges and government officials. They call their law, Common.
Many members of this community are armed.2 Some have killed to
protect their rights as conceived in their law and others have been killed
or imprisoned for refusing to be bound by any law, but their own. 3 Many
others risk such consequences. This is a community that maintains a law
at variance with official law and "is prepared - when necessary - to suffer and/or inflict violence for its 'law.' 4 In the name of that law, the community is willing to risk death; it is also willing to risk madness.
Because the purpose of law is to change the world that is into the one
that the law imagines ought to be,5 law generally avoids calling for the
realization of worlds that cannot be realized; it generally avoids demanding that which is objectively impossible. But law is not necessarily so cautious. 6 While it may be the tendency of law to demand only that which

can be realized,7 law sometimes aspires to do more.
In 1538 in Safed, the Galilee, a community insisted that its law could
hasten the advent of the Messiah. 8 That community's messianic yearnings
were precipitated by a catastrophic event, the expulsion of the Jews from
Spain in 1492,9 and its daring and doomed legal experiment ultimately
yielded not a new legal order but a mystical order based on Lurianic
Kabbalah. ° In 1996 in the heartland of America, a community, which has
been through a similar disaster of dislocation," insists that its law has dis-

placed the established order of government in this country. As the events
of Safed demonstrate, commitment to such law "risk[s] ... a form of madness."12 The risk is that the gulf between the world encoded in the community's law (the redeemed world) and the world in which the community actually lives (the unredeemed world) "will not be bridged by ...
committed practical behavior, but by [the] 'inner life"' - by negating in
imagination the world that is and replacing it with a vision that is recognizable only to a small band of true believers.
In the last year of his life, Professor Robert Cover wrote about the
attempt in Safed to bring the Messiah through law as an example of law
that risked madness and not death. He saw it as a counterpoint to his earlier work that had concentrated on the more typical state of affairs: laws
use of violence to change the world." The Common Law movement
allows us to explore both themes: the connection between law and violence and the connection between law and psychological space.
Professor Cover criticized contemporary legal theory for concentrating almost exclusively on "official" law and believed that this imbalance
should be corrected with scholarship that explored the law of private
groups. 4 To honor him, I have chosen to elaborate non-official law, the
daring Common Law that has emerged in our heartland. This law highlights one of Professor Cover's most powerful insights about law: none of
us can "ever manage a total break from other groups with other understandings of law." 5 Most scholars have concentrated on Professor Cover's
description of the discontinuities that exist among legal worlds, ignoring
that he saw the inevitability of connection. 6
We lose much by ignoring the unexpected and sometimes even monstrous ways in which narratives we retell or construct about law can be
reintegrated and charged with a purpose that we never intended. Studying
such reintegrations, seeing "our" narratives reset in the middle of other
normative worlds, can teach us much about law and about how our own
often unstated commitments are central to every bit of law we utter.
Studying the alternative normative worlds that exist all around us helps us
to see that what locates us in one legal world as opposed to another is a
very complex question that cannot fully be answered by examining the
narratives we tell or the rules of law we recognize. It helps us to see that
our location in a legal world depends on our commitments, which we too
often leave unstated or unclear. Perhaps studying the frightening new law

that has recently taken hold in many parts of our country will help us to
recognize the need to speak our own commitments more often and more
precisely.
Common Law courts have been established in as many as twenty of
the fifty states, maybe more. 17 While membership in this movement is
undoubtedly small, it is a movement with force enough to have taken root
in a geographically widespread area within a relatively short span of time,
less than twenty years. 8 Federal and state legislators have taken note of
this movement; 9 state judges have expressed increasing alarm over the
spread of this law,20 and there has been a fair bit of press coverage on the
development of these courts and their parallel world of law." Legal scholars, nonetheless, have ignored this law, these courts and the response of
official actors to the growth of this disturbing nomos.' If Professor Cover
were alive, I believe he would have been fascinated and repelled by these
developments. He has led me to them. Without Professor Cover's words,
without his genius, I would have been blind to the complexity and richness of the law around me. I thank my friend and teacher for helping me
to see.
II. Law fnom the Heartland
I begin with a few disclaimers. I am no expert in the law that I am
about to describe, and there are many parts of it that I do not understand.
It is complex23 and so divergent from conventional legal doctrine that my
formal training in law is in some ways an impediment to understanding.
As a Jew, I also found this law, which is steeped in anti-Semitism and
racism, to be particularly odious and personally frightening.24 Having
acknowledged my bias and amateur status, I will proceed to paint as true
a picture as I can of the law adhered to by some of my countrymen.
A. A World Turned Upside Down and Inside Out

[F]rom time to time various groups use these universally
understood and well-understood devices [religious
authority, contract, property and corporate law] to create
an entire nomos - an integrated world of obligation and
reality from which the rest of the world is perceived. At

that point of radical transformation of perspective, the
boundary rule - whether it be contract, free exercise of
religion, property, or corporation law - becomes more
than a rule; it becomes constitutive of a world. We witness normative mitosis. A world is turned inside out; a
wall begins to form, and its shape differs depending upon
25
which side of the wall our narratives place us on.
From our side of the wall, the law this group has created makes little,
if any, sense.26 A central tenet of that law is that their members are
"Freemen" or "Sovereign Citizens" over whom official courts lack jurisdiction.27 Official courts summarily dismiss that claim as frivolous.28 A
fundamental move in this group's nomos is the filing of common law liens

against outsiders who are charged with violating the rights of community members as conceived by their law.29 Official courts uniformly hold
that those liens are nullities" and have enjoined community members
from continuing to file them. 1 From our side of the wall, these beliefs and
activities look disjointed and bizarre, but there is meaning here. The tenet
and the move are connected, and the connection provides a key to the origin and strength of this group's law.
The connection is the land. To become a "Sovereign Citizen" one files
a "Quiet Title Action" in this group's courts.32 The person must appear in
the group's court and present a birth certificate showing that the person
was born in a state of the union and not Washington, D.C.,33 which is

-considered under the legitimate control of the federal government.,' In
our legal system, a quiet title action is an action brought by the owner of
land to remove any cloud upon the title, such as that created by an invalid
lien.3 It declares property, not people, free from the hold of others. The
transformation of this action into a method of setting people free suggests
a strong identification between real property and personhood. Moreover,
the use of liens to penalize those who deny the group's law by insisting
that group members are subject to state and federal law suggests this same
identification. From our side of the wall, these liens are viewed as troubling nuisances, harassment devices. Those on our side of the wall have
labeled these liens "soft" or "paper terrorism." 6 But, on the other side,
there is reason to believe that liens are viewed as something much more
potent, that they would not be described as "soft."

The Farm Crisis of the 1980's gave birth to the Common Law movement As we shall see, the narratives at the center of this law were borrowed from communities that antedate this legal movement. Groups like
Posse Comitatus and the Aryan Nations tried to sell these stories to the
people of the Northwest and Midwest as early as the 1970's, but few were
buying. 8 Then the Farm Crisis of the 1 980's hit, and for many farmers in
those sections of our country the world was destroyed. In Bitter Harvest,
Professor James Corcoran provides a powerful account of one world coming to an end and another being born to take its place. 9 He explains how
in the 1970's the system (banks and government) encouraged farmers to
expand and take on larger and larger debts.40 Then in 1981, "the bubble
burst."41 Recession set in and bankers began to take "a more realistic look
at what a farmer's land and machinery were worth:" the value now was
42
what those items would bring at auction.
In the morning mail, delivered to rural mailboxes by circuit-riding postmen, farmers who were either behind on
their payments or viewed by the bankers as poor risk,
received official-looking documents that notified them
that their repayment schedules had been accelerated.
They had ninety days - in some cases no more than
thirty days - to make good on outstanding loans.
Farmers with unencumbered land had to put it up as
additional collateral to cover their debts. Even the family
homestead, which had been inherited free and clear, was
not safe.... Liens were placed against living and operating expenses, and bank accounts were frozen....
Farmers unable to satisfy their lenders were forced to
quit: to sell off their land, their machinery, their home.
Those who refused to quit were torn from their corn,
soybean and wheat fields through foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings.

The sharp report of the auctioneer's gavel echoed across

the prairie. It served as the death knell to a way of life.43
The daring attempt in the early 1500's to use law to bring the
Messiah was undertaken by a group that was reeling from the loss of their
world: Jews who had been exiled from Spain, "the home of the most
important and brilliant of Jewish communities in the world."' Just as the
exile of the Jews from Spain was a disaster on many levels: economically,
culturally and spiritually," so was the crisis of the 1980's. For a farmer,
losing the land is much more than an economic disaster. As Professor
Corcoran explains so vividly, to a farmer land is "identity. It is his connection to God; it is his religion, his nationality, his family's heritage, and
his legacy to his children. 4 6 Thus, the loss was cultural and spiritual as
well as economic. At such moments, people seek out new understandings,
new integrations of reality to make sense of experience and to recreate or
replace what has been lost.
After the farm crisis hit, narratives that had previously been rejected
as crazy began to look plausible to some farmers. After all, if a world can
be destroyed, what is not possible?
The message was carried into the Heartland by extremist
apostles.... They called themselves Christians, patriots,
freeman, and citizens for a constitutional government....
[T]he message they bore ...
was anti-Semitic, racist, and

hateful. It was a message that was as ludicrous as it was
simple and one sired by desperation.
Many farmers saw it as that and turned a deaf ear....

But some farmers listened. Sure the message was crazy.
Sure it didn't make sense. But was it any crazier, or did it
make any less sense, than what was happening in the
country?47
Professor Cover helped us see that the normative worlds, created by
law, are as real as the physical world around us. 48 The normative world

embraced by some farmers and their neighbors beginning in the 1980's
created for those people a world that could replace the world they had lost
and one that helped them make sense of the cataclysm through which

they had passed. As their physical and normative world had always been
centered in the land and the rupture in their lives involved that land, it is
natural to find land at the center of their new law. It is understandable
that the quiet title action is transformed into a path to freedom. It is sensible that liens, the cause of so much of their oppression, are seen as a
powerful weapons to be turned against one's enemies. For this community, foreclosures, clouded titles and liens mark the fault line between the
old world and the new. Of course, they constitute important landmarks
in the new normative topography. What this group can express through a
proceeding to quiet title or by issuing their liens cannot be understood
without stepping into their world. On our side of the wall, these legal
devices are not similarly charged; they are relatively weak devices. But
across the divide they are powerful and thick with meaning.
B. Sources of Precepts: The Rules
They call their law "Common Law" and their courts "Common Law
Courts '49 or "Our one supreme Court." 0 Common Law for this group is
to be distinguished from statutory law," just as it is for those of us on the
other side of the wall who also use the term "common law," although usually not capitalized. Past this point, however, Common Law, as understood by this group, and common law, as understood by mainstream legal
scholars, radically diverge. Common Law not only trumps statutory law
(at least as to Sovereign Citizens) but is legitimate law in contrast with
statutory law, which is not. As they put it, in their United States "the Law
of the Land prevails (Common Law)."52 In contrast, the other United
States, which this group does not consider to be sovereign over Citizens,
is a "Legislative Democracy" with "Legislative Courts" that apply
"Statutory Law, Rules, [and] Regulations.""
The Common Law is law "pursuant to the Word of Almighty God,""
and the group's legal documents are filled with Biblical references and
quotations." The Bible is not, however, the only source of precepts for
this community's nomos. The rules of Wisconsin's Common Law Court,
for example, provide that the Court's "rule of decision is 'Holy
Scripture's,' with Magna Charta, our organic law, and our original common law of England as it was known at the time our territory of
Wisconsin became one of the several States of our Union in America. "' 56

While the Wisconsin Common Law Court's rules do not mention the
United States Constitution, 7 other documents reveal that the
Constitution looms large in this nomos, although not all of the
Constitution is viewed as legitimate or as providing a binding source of
law for Sovereign Citizens.
In their United States, the "Basic Constitution" is law."' While the
exact scope of that concept is somewhat uncertain, it includes the original document and the first ten amendments and probably little else.19
What is clear is that within this nomos the first ten amendments to the
Constitution are central,' as is the division of government into three
branches, 6' Article III's description of the judicial branch, 62 the prohibition on Tides of Nobility in Article 1,63 the guarantee of a republican form
of government to every State contained in Article IV." Indeed, the community derives the names for its courts from the United States
Constitution.
The Constitution of the united States of America, Article
III, Section I, states
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court,and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish ...... (emphasis added [by the community])
Notice that it states "one supreme court" and separates it
from any other courts that are established by legislative
acts of Congress and that those legislatively created
Courts are inferior to the "one supreme Court." The one
supreme Court being a Constitutional Court of "We the

People. "65
For this community, their courts are the one supreme Court provided for by the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court is not the
"supreme Court" referred to in Article III. Under Article I, Congress has
the power to create courts inferior to the "supreme Court," and the lower
case spelling of "supreme" in that clause and in Article III denotes for this
group that the United States Supreme Court of the Judiciary Act of
1789" is not the supreme Court of Article 111.67 The Common Law courts

are. Members of the group refer to their courts as constitutional courts"
and consider themselves constitutionalists. 69
The precepts this group considers law overlap in part with the precepts considered law by official courts in this country. The Bill of Rights,
for example, is law in the Common Law Courts and in our courts. On
the other hand, this group rejects many, if not most, of the rules that are
considered law by most Americans and official judges. Under this group's
law, the income tax is unconstitutional; 7 social security numbers are a
mark of second-class citizenship;71 state laws requiring licenses to drive a
motor vehicle are a violation of their right to travel; 72 and federal and state
7
court jurisdiction over Sovereign Citizens is invalid. 1
As Professor Cover explained, even if the precepts that a group recognizes as law are identical with those recognized as law by official courts
it does not mean we are looking at one law.74 To know a group's law, one
must know more than the rules by which it considers itself bound. Rules
require narratives to create even the semblance of a shared understanding
of their meaning, the actions they dictate, and the world they are trying
to create. 75 While the summary I have provided of the sources from which
the group culls its central precepts provides some hint of the legal world
this community has constructed, to understand this group's law we must
move on to the narratives that give the group's rules meaning, that give
this nomos history, destiny and purpose.
C. Central Narratives
The culture-specific narratives that hold this group's law together are
dark and disturbing tales, imbued with racism and anti-Semitism. Before
moving to those stories, I want to clarify what I mean when I say these
disturbing narratives are central to the group's nomos. I mean that the narratives hold the various pieces of this group's nomos together, that they
make sense of what, in the absence of some such narratives, would otherwise be a random collection of rules (dos and don't's), a jumble of meaningless rituals and an arbitrary set of acts of resistance.
By calling these narratives central, I do not mean that all members of
this community accept all of them in full. Indeed, I have no doubt that
some who accept the basic tenets of this group's law reject some of the
more noxious parts of these narratives. Some adherents to this law have

distanced themselves from the racist themes in these narratives in statements made to the press.76 While I would like very much to believe them,
my certainty that some members of this community reject parts of these
tales is not based on their press releases. For all I know, the people making those statements hold the racist themes in these narratives to be sacred
and are engaged in a cynical attempt to hide the true nature of their
beliefs from mainstream America.77 I hope that is not true, but in modern times what group has not learned to "spin" for the media? My certainty that there are some within this group that do not accept intact the
central narratives I will tell is rooted elsewhere: in my understanding of
how law grows - an understanding derived from Professor Cover's work.
Professor Cover taught that "'strong' forces: culture-specific designs
of particularist meaning" are needed to create a nomos, while "weak"
forces: broad, abstract principles, are necessary to maintain one.78 "Weak
forces" are principles broad enough to command the allegiance of a group
whose members may imagine that in the past their forefathers agreed on
particulars, although they no longer do, and who now substitute agreement on broad principles for the particular agreement that they imagine
united them in the first place. Weak forces are forces like freedom and
equality, forces that today maintain the official legal system in this country.79 Strong forces are forces like the Revolutionary War, which gave birth
to our nomos and which is now captured in tales that embody that culture-specific experience, which we imagine ourselves as owning in common with the rest of our countrymen. The culture-specific experience
that creates a nomos need not be historically verifiable: the resurrection of
Jesus is a strong force, as is God's gift of the Ten Commandments on
Mount Sinai. It need not be a "real" experience at all, which is to say that
people outside the group may consider the experience to be no more than
a bizarre fantasy inexplicably ascribed to by group believers."
The central narratives I will tell capture culture-specific experiences
that are strong enough to have created the law that now exists for this
group. They explain the group's journey through time and space, recount
the obstacles and oppressions the group has encountered along the way,
express the group's relationship to other groups around it and to the official State that purports to control the group. Most important, the narratives provide the group with a destiny. They explain not just where the
group has been but where it is going and what steps it must take to get

there; they explain, in other words, why the group's law must be what it
is. For those reasons I call them central narratives, strong forces. However,
their very potency, their ability to create a nomos, is precisely what assures
me that these stories do not exist in the same form for all members of this
81
group.
Any vision powerful enough to create a legal world creates more than
one understanding of that world, more than one understanding of the
law. "New law is constantly created through the sectarian separation of
communities. The 'Torah' becomes two, three, many Toroth as surely as
there are teachers to teach or students to study."8 2 Parts of a tradition are
rejected by one subcommunity and embraced as fundamental by another. The central narratives are retold, and in the retelling they are transformed until in some subcommunities they can no longer be recognized
as the same stories that are held sacred by others within the larger group.
Because I believe this is how law grows and that this process is inevitable,
I am confident that the narratives I will tell have many variants and that
some of them are likely to have purged the racist and anti-Semitic themes
that appear so dominant in some of the tales presented below. Thus, while
I claim these stories are central, I do not mean these precise stories, but
rather some version of these stories or stories like them.
We begin with an edict issued by "The Honorable Justice Frederick
G. Kriemelmeyer," of the one supreme Court in and for La Crosse county, Wisconsin. 3 The edict opens with a lengthy biblical exegesis intended
to establish that white people8 4 are the only sons of Adam, the only form
of man recognized in the Bible, the true nation of Israel and thus God's
chosen people, for whom alone the Bible was written.5 In this story Jews,
African-Americans and other people of color are the "beasts" of the Bible,
the descendants of Cain and Satan. 6 Kriemelmeyer's Court establishes
through tracing the lineage of one of its judges, as an example, that white
people are the descendants of the tribes of Israel. 7 It identifies Congress
and state legislatures with the prophets of Baal and proclaims the "manmade laws" passed by those bodies, invalid. 8 It distinguishes between
God's law and laws passed under "color of law," which are false and
invalid laws passed by legislatures.8 9 To apply for welfare, or for a social
security card, marriage license or driver's license from the government is
to give up one's status as a "freeman" and become a slave, who the agents
of government may "'tax' at their will."90

The story told in the Wisconsin Edict is sacred to the religious sect
called Christian Identity which added noxious themes of racism and antiSemitism to British Israelism, a religious movement born in the 1800's
that connected the whites of Europe to the lost tribes of Israel.9 The
Wisconsin edict, with its elaborate account of the Christian Identity narrative, is atypical in that it explicitly places this narrative at the center of
the Common Law. Most Common Law documents in contrast make no
explicit reference to this tale. It is, therefore, possible that the Wisconsin
Edict misrepresents the centrality of this tale.
While recognizing this possibility, I reject it because those who have
spent considerable time monitoring the Common Law movement and
the radical right agree that the Christian Identity narrative provides the
unifying ideology for these groups. 92 Moreover, I would not expect the
court opinions or legal documents from any legal system to recount as a
routine matter the system's central narratives. Consider how few of the
court opinions in our system recount the tale of our Revolution or the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Constitution or any of the
other narratives that might be considered central to our law. As a general
matter, legal systems take their central narratives for granted. Indeed, an
opinion that recounts a central narrative normally signals either that an
extraordinary challenge to the system has been made or that a novel legal
step is about to be sanctioned by the court, which seeks to legitimize the
move by tying it back to basics. Therefore, despite the fact that most of
the Common Law papers I have been able to collect do not retell the
Christian Identity story in full, I am prepared to call the story central to
many, if not all, of those within the Common Law movement. This judgment is strongly reinforced by how closely the narrative tracks the central
themes of this law. We now turn to just how the story organizes and
unites many of the precepts that make up this law.
The story divides Americans into two classes, the chosen and the
damned. That division predicts the division of American citizenry into
two classes, which one finds in the Common Law: Sovereign Citizenship
and 14th Amendment Citizenship." Sovereign Citizenship, which
belongs to group members as a matter of birthright,94 guarantees one freedom from tyranny (the jurisdiction of the federal and state governments
and their illegitimate courts) 5 and recognizes one's God-given inalienable
rights. 96 14th Amendment citizenship is not only less ennobling but is

akin to the mark of Cain, a badge of slavery, made for lesser beings, specifically African-Americans and others considered non-white in this group's
eyes. The other United States (ours) is the home of the 14th Amendment
slave as opposed to their United States, home of Freemen: the original,
privileged, noble citizensY The Christian Identity narrative dictates just
such a distinction: a distinction between the chosen people and the misbegotten others that populate the earth.
The story also locates the group in relation to the government. It suggests that the State has somehow been corrupted and is exercising power
unjustly over God's Chosen People. The story provides meaning for the
archetypical moves made by followers of this community's law, like divesting oneself of one's drivers license and refusing to pay taxes, justifying
those moves as attempts to reclaim one's birthright as a free and Sovereign
being. Most important, the story not only unites the people of this community into a group and locates that group in relation to others, it fuses
the group's identity with the land. The land is what God promised his
Chosen People, according to the Bible, and, as we have already seen, the
quiet title action, as understood in the Common Law, similarly fuses
identity with land." Likewise, the story gives added meaning to the filing
of liens against group enemies." Those who are not God's Chosen People
do not have clear title to the land. At most, those people may occupy the
land so long as they do not interfere with the destiny of God's Chosen
People. The liens give expression to that message, clouding title precisely
as the story suggests is just.
The Christian Identity narrative locates the group's law in a charter,
the Bible, that is not part of official government law. The government and
its laws are understood from the perspective of that charter, not by interpreting precepts accepted by the State as law. The fundamental source of
the group's law is thus placed outside the corpusjurisacknowledged as law
by the state, although in a text sacred to many other communities.' The
fact that the story is rooted in a familiar and accessible text is undoubtedly an advantage in recruiting members to the group, however idiosyncratic the interpretation of that text is. On the other hand, grounding
one's law in the Bible has some disadvantages in American society.
While the Bible is undeniably a powerful base upon which to build
law, in our country where the principle of separation of church and state
is foundational, any "law" based exclusively on biblical precepts and inter-

pretation is vulnerable to the charge that it is "merely religion" and not
"law," at all. In our system, it is thus particularly important for any group
that aspires to maintain its own law to have a secular story that justifies
its claim, no matter how secondary that story is from the perspective of
the group. The need for a narrative based on State law is particularly acute
for groups that seek not merely insular autonomy (autonomy to live out
one's own law within the larger State), but the redemption of the larger
community through a substitution of the group's nomos for that currently accepted as official State law.O1 Redemptive communities seek and find
legitimacy for the substitution of law that they propose in the sources
upon which current State law is based. What better proof that their law
is the true law could there be?
The Common Law movement is a redemptive movement: it postulates the unredeemed character of the State's ongoing nomos, sets forth an
alternative, and requires a commitment to replace one law with the
other.102 It seeks to free, not just law, but people, to raise both law and persons "from a fallen state."' Redemptive communities, like the antislavery movement and the right to life movement, commonly appeal to both
Biblical and State sources to build their law. The Bible is a common feature because enormous energy is needed to change a world. Religion, with
its vocabulary of redemption and traditions of sacrifice, is capable of producing the commitment and energy that is needed for this Herculean
task. State Law is a common feature because all law, and new law in particular, must account for its legitimacy. There is no more powerful critique of an ongoing nomos than to use the sources that proclaim the legitimacy of the current order to undermine it."m As we have already seen, the
Common Law movement, like other redemptive movements, makes
extensive use of the Bible. We now turn to how it, like other redemptive
communities, uses State sources to ground its law and delegitimize the
current order.
The Common Law narratives that are based on State sources start out
looking remarkably orthodox:
The United States Constitution was basically the shackles placed on the federal government by a sovereign people. The people possessed God-given rights. Those rights
were only secured by the Constitution. All rights not

specifically granted to the government were reserved for
the people.'
That paragraph is so innocuous that it could be substituted for the
corresponding text in any public school's civics textbook without causing
anyone uneasiness. By beginning at "our" beginning, this group reaches
out to the larger community, reveals itself to be the offspring of our
world, and positions itself as "redeemer" and not "overthrower" of the recognized order.
The story now moves on to establish that the recognized order is corrupt and thus needs redeeming. When did it fall? Here, the community
provides several explanations - overlapping and confirming proofs, if
you will - to show that the State threw off its "shackles" and abandoned
its commitment to our original and righteous destiny. From what I can
discern, the most important of these tales dates the rupture at 1933.106 In
1933, President Roosevelt took office and proclaimed that a state of emergency existed in the nation, the Great Depression. 1 7 According to this
community's narrative: Roosevelt, backed by a subservient Congress, proceeded to suspend the Constitution to deal with this so-called emergency,
a patently unlawful act.'0 8 The unlawfully declared state of emergency has
never been rescinded. 109 Under it, the people's rights have been suspended."0 The federal government has thus been operating unlawfully, i.e.,
outside the shackles of the Constitution, since 1933."' The Constitution
remains suspended to this day.112 The community is dedicated to restor113
ing it.
The factual predicates for this story are solid. Consider the following
excerpt, written by mainstream legal scholars and published in Michigan
Law School's JournalofInternationalLaw with the usual law review attention to citation:"'
With the Great Depression and the eventual election of
Franklin Roosevelt, a virtual revolutionary expansion of
presidential emergency powers occurred. In part,
Roosevelt benefitted from broad delegations of authority
from Congress, endorsed by the courts. In part, he acted
on his own when, in his words, "unprecedented demand
and need for undelayed action may call for temporary
departure" from the Constitution. [Inaugural Address of

Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 15
(1938)]. In the first 100 days of his presidency, President
Roosevelt issued the second emergency proclamation in
the nation's history, in which he dosed the banks and
stopped all financial transactions. [Proclamation No.
2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933)]. Congress ratified the
President's emergency actions within three days, [Bank
Conservation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1988)], establishing a pattern of executive initiative and legislative
acquiescence that is still the norm today. Although the
Supreme Court struck down two early sweeping delegations to Roosevelt, [A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)], by 1937 the
President's threatened Supreme Court packing, his landslide reelection, and new personnel on the Court produced a majority willing to endorse emergency measures.
[See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1936).].
As this shows, the facts are not what distinguishes the Common Law
narrative from a tale someone outside the community could tell."'
Rather, it is the meaning attached to these facts, how they are charged,
how central they are in one nomos as opposed to another, that distinguishes the Common Law narrative from more mainstream stories. In
most contemporary mainstream narratives, the steps taken by Roosevelt
and the Congress to deal with the Great Depression, and the Supreme
Court's eventual acceptance of those steps, do not mark the end of constitutional government." 6 Most mainstream narratives assign these events
as central a place in our nomos as they occupy in the Common Law
nomos,"7 but a fundamentally different meaning. In most mainstream
narratives," ' these events signal not the Constitution's demise, but its
restoration,'" or its laudable and proper adoption to new circumstances2
or, in a more recent addition to our narrative tradition, its amendment
through lawful, albeit extra-textual, procedures. 2 '
Moreover, the Common Law narratives do not simply mark the New

Deal events as the end of constitutional government, they attribute that
1 "
end to the ascendance of interests hostile to those of "the people."
Mainstream narratives, including those that insist that the administrative
state ushered in by the New Deal is unconstitutional, portray the modern
government as a reflection of popular will.3
The Common Law narratives tell of a government captured by hostile forces: a government now turned against the people, instead of emanating from them.12' Thus, in the Common Law narratives the Bank
Conservation Act,12 5 which ratified President Roosevelt's emergency
proclamation temporarily closing the banks and, as it turned out, permanently took the country off the gold standard,12 6 takes on enormous significance1 2 7 because it was passed as an amendment to the Trading with
the Enemy Act (TWEA). In the Common Law narratives, the Bank
Conservation Act was passed at the behest of banks,12 9 to benefit them
and to act against the people, who would be prevented from removing
their property from the grasp of the bankersO and would have their property (gold-backed money) replaced with illegal "wartime scrip.' ' 31 The
narrative thus explains that this legislation was an attack on the people
and emphasizes that this attack was passed as an extension of the TWEA.
The lesson of the narrative is clear: with this Act the American people
were defined as the enemy by their government, which was now in the
32
hands of the bankers.1
By highlighting the Bank Conservation Act, 33 the Common Law secular narrative, which I have summarized, reinforces themes found in that
community's central religious narrative. The anti-Semitic theme in the
religious narrative is conjured by placing bankers, a widely used code
phrase for Jews, in the role of those who captured the government and
turned it against the people.'3 The secular narrative, like the religious narrative, identifies the State, not with the people, but with the forces of evil
and teaches that those forces are aligned against the people and their con3
stitutional/God-given right to freedom.) 1
Another secular-based narrative important in the Common Law
nomos concerns an earlier period of our history, Reconstruction. This narrative explains how the Civil War Amendments16 were not properly ratified by the states. 37 Although the narrative thus relegates these amendments to the realm of the unlawful, the point of the narrative is not to
erase these amendments from the legal world of the Common Law. To the

contrary, tainting the amendments is part of the process by which these
amendments become available receptacles for new meaning. Re-imagined
the amendments take their place as important features in the Common
Law nomos.

According to this Common Law narrative, the 14th Amendment created a new and inferior form of citizenship, federal citizenship,' to be
contrasted with sovereign, state citizenship, recognized by the original
(and valid) Constitution. 9 Federal citizens alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the federal government and the federal courts. ' 4 While in "our"
legal world, the 14th Amendment's due process clause extends the protection of the Bill of Rights to prevent encroachments of those rights by
the states,' 4' in the Common Law world the 14th Amendment means that
federal citizens are not guaranteed the protection of the Bill of Rights
guaranteed to all Sovereign Citizens. Instead, the 14th Amendment limits federal citizens to protections against interference with "due process"
and denials of "equal protection of the laws," which describes a much
more limited form of freedom.142
This narrative once again resonates with the themes found in the religious narrative. The concept that the 14th Amendment created a lesser
form of citizenship reinforces the racist theme in the religious narrative,
which describes African-Americans not as true "men," but as beasts.
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also identifies the community, with those for whom the Constitution was
written, state/Sovereign Citizens. That reading meshes with the identification of the community with the "chosen people," a theme developed in
the religious narratives. Both narratives thus assign the community a privileged position in relation to others who occupy the same geographical
space. Perhaps most interesting, the 14th Amendment narrative demonstrates just how profoundly narrative may transform the meaning of a precept. In "our" legal world, the Reconstruction Amendments mark the end
of two nations on one soil. In the Common Law narrative, one of those
amendments creates just that: two classes of citizenship, two United States
of America.
There are many other secular narratives within this community that
support the themes developed in its New Deal and 14th Amendment
tales.' " Not surprisingly, many of these supporting tales, which are
designed to show how the government has unlawfully oppressed Sovereign
Citizens, reducing them to "serfdom," 41 center on farmers and the laws

that most affect them. 146 Inasmuch as those tales replay themes we have
already examined through the more central narratives on the New Deal
and the 14th Amendment, I will not devote more time to them here.
One of the most deeply cherished principles in the Common Law
nomos is that the State may not impose income taxes on Sovereign
Citizens. There are Common Law narratives that deal specifically with the
illegitimacy of income taxation, 147 apparently including a narrative on
how the 16th Amendment to the Constitution, like the 14th, is illegiti14
mate because it was not ratified by the appropriate number of states. ,
The interested reader will, however, have to negotiate those stories on her
own. Despite how large a role income tax resistance plays in the Common
Law nomos, I have decided not to dwell on the subject for two reasons.
First, I am not knowledgeable enough about "our" tax law to prove a reliable guide through "theirs." Second, the "no income taxation" precept is
a specific instance of the more general Common Law position that the
federal and the state governments in this country are illegitimate. We have
been examining the Common Law narratives that support that position,
and the taxation precept follows from those stories. I thus thought I could
avoid elaborating on the narratives that are devoted more particularly to
supporting the "no tax" precept. On the other hand, no law can be
grasped through logic alone. I therefore believed it important to pause
from the task at hand to highlight the fact that income taxation is singled
out by this community as one of the most abhorrent of the government's
laws. Having done so, it is time to continue with the narratives that
explain the fall of legitimate government, federal and state.14
This community claims to have resurrected the Common Law. That
implies that at some point that law died. Narratives must exist within this
community that explain when and how that imposter-thing, which calls
itself the legitimate government, disavowed this most precious of gifts, the
Common Law. One such narrative has already been mentioned: the story
that tells how the Judiciary Act of 1789 substituted the United States
Supreme Court for the one supreme Court of the true Constitution. 5
For this community, the Judiciary Act of 1789 thus marks the beginning
of the end of the Common Law. Another narrative explains how that end
came in 1938,'' the year of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins.1 2
Erie is an important case in "our" legal world. By that I mean both
that the case is widely studied and discussed' and that it supports a num-

ber of important narratives - stories that use the case to communicate
important messages about the meaning of "our" legal world. ' It is also an
important case in the Common Law nomos. In that world, Erieproves the
illegitimacy of "our" courts, federal and state, because in Eriethe Supreme
Court of the United States, the highest court in "our" land, renounced the
Common Law as a rule of decision. '
For this community Erie is the smoking gun. Erieannounced: "There
is no federal general common law."' 56 In a world in which the Common
Law is not only one's birthright,1 7 but tantamount to the word of God,'
there could be no more horrific statement. Of course, most mainstream
narratives deny that Erie renounced all common law. They explain Erieas
the triumph of the right of state courts to articulate their own common
law, free of federal second-guessing.' 59 Common law that varies from state
to state is, however, not Common Law. The Common Law folks are not
legal positivists. Their Common Law is the common law of Blackstone, a
type of natural law ordained by God.'"° In the Common Law nomos, it
would "hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute [the
Common Law]. They are, at most, only evidence of what the [Common
Law is], and are not of themselves law.' 6' The language is from Justice

Story's opinion for the Court in Swift v. Tyson, the case Erie overruled.
Erie did abandon Swif's understanding of common law as natural law;' 62
it did thus abandon the Common Law, which is sacred to this community.After Erie, in the eyes of this community, some imposter-thing, which
masquerades as law, was substituted for the Law that should reign and
once did.
Erie is also an important piece of the tale that explains the Common
Law community condemnation of "our" United States (the federal and
the state governments) as a "legislative democracy" with "legislative
courts.
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Not only does Erie abandon the Common Law, it puts in its

place "the law of the State."'" Moreover, the Supreme Court announced
its indifference on the source of that law: "[W]hether the law of the State
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern." In the Common Law nomos,
this language can be read as the Supreme Court encouraging states to
abandon their common law systems in favor of illegitimate legislative
democracies. 6 For the Common Law community, the republican form of
government guaranteed by the Constitution is the Common Law sys-

tem. I" Thus, the Supreme Court's indifference to whether the states abandoned common law in favor of legislation is anathema, another sign that
the Constitution had been abandoned.
The Common Law community's narrative on Erie emphasizes that
the state law, which triumphed in that case, limited the railroad's duty of
care to those with whom the railroad was in privity of contract. 67 When
injured, Tompkins had been walking beside the tracks,'" a pedestrian not
a passenger, and thus someone not in privity of contract with the railroad.
In the Common Law world the result in Erie (state privity of contract rule
governs) demonstrates that Erie substituted contract law for the Common
Law,' 9 which at the time imposed a duty of care toward foreseeable others, like the pedestrian Tompkins.170 This community's understanding that
commercial law reigns in the federal and state courts - an understanding that comes out of their story about Erie - has enormous implications
for how community members respond to "our" law, a subject we will turn
to shortly. Here the point is that a familiar source, Erie, supports an
understanding that is foreign to "our" legal world - that invalid commercial law courts, applying contract law over Common Law, have
replaced constitutionally mandated Common Law courts - and that it
is narrative that carries this new meaning. Before moving on, there are
other narratives about Erie to explore.
Just as the mainstream community has long been intrigued with the
connection between Erie and the adoption that same year of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 7' so too the Common Law community finds
meaning in the confluence of these two events. A typical mainstream narrative on the connection takes the following shape:
Before 1938 the federal courts in diversity cases applied
federal substantive law through state procedure (except in
equity case); after 1938 they applied state substantive law
through federal procedure. 172
As the quote above, suggests "equity' is not generally seen as central to
understanding the connection between Erie and the Federal Rules. In the
Common Law narratives, however, it is an important piece of the puzzle.
The Common Law narratives place enormous significance on the fact that
the Federal Rules of 1938 abolished the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity. 73 Unlike narratives in "our" world, however, the

Common Law narratives equate "actions at law" with the Common Law.174
But the Federal Rules could not have meant that Common Law actions
were to be merged with equity suits because Erie had abolished the
Common Law. The Federal Rules must then mean that equity suits were
to be treated not as if they were Common Law actions, but as if they were
admiralty suits, admiralty jurisdiction being the third and only remaining
jurisdiction recognized by the Constitution (the other two being the now
abolished Common Law and the now submerged equity)."'
Thus, by putting Erie and the Federal Rules together, we have a story
that explains the Common Law insistence that the federal courts possess
only admiralty jurisdiction.176 Erie and the Federal Rules explain the
Common Law view that the federal courts are trying to foist admiralty
law upon the people. According to the Common Law community, the
momentous shift of 1938 took place without the consent or knowledge
of the people, buried as it was in the intricacies of Erie and the Federal
Rules."7 Common Law adherents claim, however, that the 1938 switch to
admiralty was officially recognized in 1966 when the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended to "abolish the distinction between civil
actions and suits in admiralty."1 78 The true nature of the federal courts'7
as courts of admiralty is further confirmed, according to this community,
by the gold-fringed flag that is displayed in federal courts.18
While in "our" legal world, the "fringe on the flag" story may seem
lunatic, and the Christian Identity narrative may seem perverted and
filled with hate, many of the other narratives central to the Common Law
community dovetail quite closely with stories that are part of "our" legal
world. In "our" world people write of the federal government's expansive
use of emergency powers;-1 of the Constitution dying with the triumph
of the New Deal's administrative state;'82 of the questionable procedures
by which the Reconstruction Amendments became part of our
Constitution;'83 and of Eriesignalling a revolutionary shift away from natural law.'84 It will undoubtedly surprise many that a community so
removed from the interpretive community of legal scholars, judges and
lawyers to which we belong' 8' shares so many of the narratives that are
alive, although perhaps not dominant, in "our" world. It would not have
surprised Professor Cover:
Neither religious churches, however small and dedicated,

nor utopian communities, however isolated, nor cadres
of judges, however independent, can ever manage a total
break from other groups with other understandings of
law. Thus it is that the Shaker understanding of "contract" is hardly independent of understandings of contract that were prevalent in the nineteenth century."'
The legal meanings that coexist in the United States today are interdependent, and thus in one sense we can say that we and our judges along
with the Common Law adherents and their judges "are all engaged in the
task of constitutional understanding. But [our] distinct starting points,
identifications, and stories make us realize that we cannot pretend to a
unitary law." '87 I do not fear that you will confuse the Common Law community's law with our own, that my audience will "pretend" to see one
law, where I see two. Rather, I close this section on narrative by stressing
the interdependence of legal worlds for another reason: because it is "possible to say that [the Common Law adherents and we] are all engaged in
the task of constitutional understanding,"'8 and that fact demands our
attention.
They can hear us, whether or not we can hear them. We may imagine our "interpretive community' is circumscribed and safe, but that is
our fantasy. However much we might wish it otherwise, we are engaged
in the "task of constitutional understanding" with some who have very
different commitments from our own. It is to the subject of commitment
that we now turn, theirs and ours.
D. Commitment

Rules and stories alone are not enough to constitute law. Law is not
literature or philosophy. What distinguishes law from these other genres,
which in common with law contain stories that yield moral precepts, is
commitment - a dedication of human will, an intention to live by, and
hold others to, the norms embodied in the rules and stories.
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say the

Common Law folks have their own law because they are not just telling
stories; their stories are intended to guide behavior today. These people
are prepared to, and do, live by their law. Their stories and precepts are
insistent in their demand to be realized in concrete action. They are
intended as law and lived as law, and I call them law for those reasons.

Refusing to dignify this nomos with the name of law will not change the
reality that from their side of the wall that is exactly what it is.
" [M]ost communities will avoid outright conflict with a judge's interpretatioris, at least when he will likely back them with violence." ' Some
communities are able' to live by law that conflicts with State law because
judges are particularly unlikely to use violence against the community's
members. In other words, the State's commitment to its own law varies
depending on the nature of the community that challenges the State. For
example, elsewhere I have explained how the legal profession is able to
maintain a law on the responsibilities of lawyers that is at odds with State
law because judges are quite reluctant to use violence against lawyers to
insist that they follow State law.191 As we shall see, however, judges are particularly likely to use violence against Common Law adherents. The question here then is how can this community maintain its law in the face of
a strong state commitment to kill it off.
For a group to live its law in the face of the predictable
employment of violence against it requires a new elaboration of "law" - the development of an understanding
of what is right and just in the violent contexts that the
group will encounter.1 9
The Common Law community does not say: "The government is
corrupt, so tear it down any way possible." Some mass movements that
advocate violence against the established order may be just that simple,
but they do not have law. 193This community does, which means that the
steps to be taken in resisting the established order are calibrated by that
law. "Anything goes," is not the language of law. What goes, where and
when and why are serious matters once a community has law. To have
"law," is to have an elaboration of what actions are appropriate (lawful) in
confrontations with those who deny that law. It is to this "secondary
hermeneutic," the Common Law community's "interpretation [s]
of [its]
texts of resistance,"' that we now turn.
The Common Law distinguishes between moves members should take
now and moves that would be celebrated, if taken, but which are not
expected of all. 19 Not surprisingly, the moves it "requires" 96 of Sovereign
Citizens are nonviolent. This group is not oblivious to the State's ability to
win most contests of violence. By not "demanding" violent moves, it helps

ensure that the State will not kill off all its members and makes room in
the community for people not prepared to die for principle. As a practical
matter, without such accommodations, the community would simply not
be large enough, or around long enough, to sustain a vision of law.
Instead of violent action, the Common Law requires such nonviolent
moves as: giving up one's social security card and one's driver's license;
relying on certain sections of the Uniform Commercial Code in dealing
with the government; and invoking Common Law court process to
declare oneself a Sovereign Citizen. Let's take these moves in order.
Having worked our way through the secular narratives that hold this
law together, we can understand why renouncing one's social security card
and driver's license are acts filled with meaning in the Common Law
nomos. After the Constitution was suspended in 1933, the Common Law
(itself constitutionally mandated) limped along until 1938 when it (the
last vestige of constitutional order) was summarily replaced9 7 by statutory law/admiralty law/commercial law, '98 a new form of social contract. It
is this new and illegitimate social contract that must be disavowed.
No more perfect symbol for this new social contract could be imagined than a federally-issued social security card, concrete and ubiquitous
evidence of the new government that took over after the New Deal. Thus,
to accomplish a lawful secession from "our" United States, community
members are advised to renounce their social security numbers.19 Other
"contracts" with the federal government, like federally-backed welfare
payments, are also to be renounced,2" but the Common Law texts of
resistance do not emphasize those as much, presumably because fewer
people have such contracts to renounce.
According to the Common Law, state governments are as illegitimate
(statutory/unconstitutional) as the federal government. The Common
Law thus requires the renunciation of contractual relations with state governments as well. This is typically to be accomplished through renouncing one's driver's license. As social security numbers are pervasive evidence
of the administrative state, a driver's license is conceived of as an interference with one's basic (and constitutional) right to free travel, the right to
roam freely in one's own land.-1 Thus, renouncing those "contracts" is
also an act filled with meaning in this nomos, an act commensurate with
reclaiming one's rightful relation to the land.
Upon first approaching the Common Law, I was mystified by the

importance this community attached to the UCC.22 Unlike the Bible and

the Constitution, it struck me as a quite unlikely source of law for a community of radicals. Once I understood that the community had reconceived the State's jurisdiction as based on contract law (not the original
social contract of the Constitution but some illegitimate contract substituted for the Constitution after 1938), the community's obsession with
the UCC began to make sense. If the task is to extricate oneself from a
reign conceived of as based on illegitimate contract law, the UCC is a natural place to look.
Thus, in the Common Law the UCC becomes a central text of resistance. For example, one Common Law text is entitled: "The UCC
Connection, Free Yourself from Legal Tyranny." In this text, the UCC is
portrayed as the law that "our" United States is bound to follow, having
renounced constitutional law, Common Law and Equity.20 3 The official

comment to section 1-207 of the UCC explains that that section is
intended for situations "where one party is claiming as of right something
which the other believes is unwarranted." 2 ° That is precisely the situation
that obtains between the State and the Common Law community,
according to the Common Law: the State is claiming a right to impose its
extra-constitutional (statutory, contract-based, admiralty) law on the
Common Law community, and the community considers that assumption of sovereignty over community members to be unwarranted. Thus,
section 1-207 of the UCC takes on enormous importance in the
Common Law world. According to the Common Law, this section of
"our" law provides an "out" from State law for Common Law community members. As the Comment to section 1-207 states:
This section provides a machinery for continuation of
performance along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute, by adopting the mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or
payment "without prejudice," "under protest," "under
reserve," "with reservation of all our rights" and the
like.... 205
Common Law adherents are advised by their law to invoke the phrases
listed by the UCC authors when dealing with the State. Common Law
members routinely rely on these phrases when filing documents with any

part of "our" government or appearing in "our" courts." 6 For example,
Common Law adherents who do not give up their drivers' licenses
altogether are advised to write "without prejudice, UCC 1-207" under their
signature on the license.
According to the Common Law, the "out" from "statutory law" provided by section 1-207 places the Common Law adherent back within the jurisdiction of the Common Law. The "in" is provided by section 1-103. That
section provides that contracts are subject to general legal principles of common law (as well as any other applicable law) where that law is not specifically displaced by the UCC. Thus, according to the Common Law, when
one opts out of the State's law via section 1-207, section 1-103 leaves their
relations with the State to be decided under the Common Law. Under this
construction, section 1-103 compels State courts to apply the Common Law
to adherents who reserved their rights under section 1-207.7
Other committed communities use constitutional precepts to establish boundaries between themselves and the State. For example, religious
communities typically use the free exercise clause of the 1st amendment;" journalists, the free press clause;29 and the legal profession, the
6th Amendment.210 Undoubtedly, groups that seek freedom for their own
law generally choose constitutional precepts as boundary rules because the
State acknowledges those precepts to be supreme law. Constitutional precepts thus promise the group the greatest protection from other State law
that conflicts with the group's own.21' But the Common Law rejects the
idea that the State abides by the Constitution, which makes the choice of
a boundary rule more complex.
The Constitution, as interpreted by this group, legitimizes their law.
Indeed, it makes the Common Law the law of the land, and makes their
courts the supreme Courts of this nation. But, as it is a central tenet of
the Common Law nomos that the State has disowned the Constitution,
appealing to the Constitution in confrontations with the State would
involve the community in contradiction. It would imply that the State
honored that document. The community refuses to do that.
In confrontations with the state, the Common Law community
insists on locating its right to maintain its own law (on locating its boundary rule) in State law as the Common Law insists State law to be (contract
law/the UCC). This is a costly move for the community because it renders their claim to nomic autonomy incomprehensible to the State. From

our side of the wall, it makes no sense to appeal to the UCC as a means
of freeing oneself from the reach of federal and state law or courts, just as
giving up one's drivers' license and social security card appear from "our"
side of the wall to be random and ridiculous acts of "no saying" precisely
because to us these acts signify so little. On the other hand, what their law
looks like to us or "our" officials makes little difference to this group a position of extreme commitment, which renders the group and its
212
members quite vulnerable to the force of State law.
While the renunciation of drivers' licenses, which includes renouncing license plates for many members of the community, and the invocation of the UCC are in and of themselves nonviolent moves, they encourage community members to flout State law, which invites the State to use
violence in response. The Common Law must then provide a repertoire
of moves to deal with the violent reaction these basic moves might provoke. At that point, do the Common Law's texts of resistance elaborate a
law of martyrdom or violent resistance?" 3 We are moving toward that
question, but are not quite prepared to deal with it yet. Between the
extremes of nonviolence and killing or allowing oneself to be killed, there
are intermediate moves to consider first.
The Common Law authorizes Sovereign Citizens to interfere with the
property of State agents who attempt to enforce State law against community members. Sovereign Citizens file liens against the property of IRS
agents who attempt to collect taxes from community members;214 judges
who attempt to impose State jurisdiction on them;" prosecutors who
attempt to indict them or refuse to take action as they request; 6 and anyone else who interferes with Common Law community members.17
These liens are filed in county clerk offices in "our" court system. They sit
like "ticking time bombs" on the property rights of the target, who may
not become aware of their existence until she moves to sell her home.218
2 19
To remove the lien "our" law requires the target to invoke legal process.
These liens have been described in "our" world as paper terrorism.20 The
important point here is that they impose real costs on others for having
violated Common Law. These liens provide the Common Law with force,
however transitory the impact of that force is. The filing of liens is not a
move designed to "win." "Our" law cancels out the permanent effects of
theirs. On the other hand, this move is felt in "our" world; it operates in
"our" world for however brief a time.

The next move, declaring one's Sovereignty through a quiet title
process, is in and of itself a nonviolent act. The Common Law court
and/or Sovereign Citizen gives public notice of the quiet title proceeding.' After receiving appropriate evidence to establish that the applicant
is eligible for status as a Sovereign Citizen,m the Common Law court
declares the applicants "tide" clear, i.e., proclaims him Sovereign. What
does it mean that this community has established courts to serve as a gateway to community membership?
Establishing courts to effectuate some form of transformation
through law is an act of commitment in itself. The nature of the commitment embodied in the quiet title move is thus fundamentally different than the commitment expressed by renouncing one's driver's license
or filing a lien in "our" courts. The latter moves do not imply that an
independent court stands at the ready to back up the community's law.
The quiet title moves suggests precisely that.
What "force" do the Common Law courts imply? This, as it turns out,
is an extraordinarily complex question, which the community itself is
struggling to work out. But two things seems clear. First, Common Law
adherents aretrying to work it out. In other words, they intend their courts
to be "courts," their judges to write law and not novels, their proceedings
to be proceedings in law and not theatrical presentations. Second, whatever they intend or ultimately decide, on "our" side of the wall the fact that
they have created courts escalates the challenge posed by their law. Courts
are powerful symbols. Our myths and our history teach us that courts are
established to proclaim what is not law, to kill off some legal understandings.2 4 The content of the Common Law makes it apparent that the law
these courts were established to kill is "ours." Moreover, these parallel
courts threaten to reveal an important weakness in our own courts - a
weakness inherent in all courts, but one that is ordinarily masked.
Consider the French government's reaction when Bertrand Russell and
Jean Paul Sartre tried to convene a court on French soil to try the United
States for its conduct of the Vietnam war. "3 The founders of that court
expressly disclaimed any intent to enforce its judgment, " , yet De Gaulle
understood that conjuring any sort of court to judge a State was an act of
commitment unlike other protest, and he acted to stop it. The very impotence of such courts invites us to see that "Official" courts stand on similarly shaky ground when they purport to judge the State: official courts too

may be left speaking law without the force to back it up, if they try to judge
a King or President. Thus, any court that purports to judge the State is powerful because it threatens to reveal the vulnerability of "real" courts. Thus,
even mock courts, like Sartre's, are dangerous in that they mock the notion
that any law can control power, can judge the mighty, and thus undermine
the difference between "real" courts and themselves.
The Common Law community, however, intends - and those on
"our" side of the wall perceive - the Common Law and its courts to be
powerful in the physical world as well as in the realm of symbols.'
Inundating "our" court system with Common Law court documents,
another common move, involves real costs on the court system and on the
individuals who must respond to what "our" system perceives as bogus
documents. 9 But the power of these courts and this law is not exhausted
by this "paper terrorism."
In March 1995, a Common Law court in Montana ordered Judge
Martha Bethel (a municipal judge in a Montana court "we"recognize) to
dismiss traffic charges against a Sovereign Citizen or face arrest. 3 ' The
Sovereign Citizen had appeared before her in January, had attempted to
enter a special appearance to contest the state court's jurisdiction over him
and had announced that he was not bound by the laws of Montana.23
When Judge Bethel refused to honor the Common Law position
espoused by the man before her, he apparently filed some sort of complaint against her in a Common Law court. That court then issued its
order to Judge Bethel, which she did not honor. Judge Bethel then began
to receive threats that she would be kidnapped and tried before the
Common Law court. Her "punishment" did not, however, end there. As
she has recounted:
After someone threatened to "riddle my home with gunfire," the police came to map my house and land. They
told me which room to hide in if the house were
attacked. They suggested I pack a duffel bag and a police
radio, flashlight and other emergency gear. They mapped
out where in the woods I would hide with the children if
we had to run.
Over Easter weekend, the police suggested we leave the
county after they received information that an attack

would be made on me or my house. Most recently, a
Federal law enforcement agency told me a contract had
been issued for my murder. 2
Judge Bethel is, moreover, not the only one of "our" judges to be
threatened in this manner by these courts or the Common Law. Other
state court judges have received such threats and some of them, like
Bethel, see these threats as serious enough to have sought police protection, which has been provided. 233 These anecdotes support the conclusion
that at least some segment of the Common Law movement demonstrates
commitment to its law by threatening violence against those who would
impose State law. This is obviously intended to weaken the commitment
of people on "our" side of the wall to "our" law.
It is difficult to discern how widespread the commitment to threaten
violence is within the Common Law community or whether that commitment extends to the use of violence by substantial numbers within this
community. In part, these questions are difficult to answer because the
community's position is still developing. Practice, on the other hand,
seems to be outrunning theory. Increasingly, Common Law courts are
issuing indictments against State officials,-" although there seems to be no
generally accepted understanding of how these indictments are to be
enforced - no generally accepted understanding of the level of commitment due these documents or the manner in which that commitment is
235
to be expressed.
An indictment is a form of conditional threat (if convicted, x will
happen),2 a conditional threat that is lawful, at least, within the system
that issues it. The Common Law indictments threaten conviction for
238
treason23 7 and thereafter a punishment of imprisonment or death.
Notice, however, that by issuing "indictments," instead of "convictions,"
the community signals that officially it has not yet called for blood. Small
comfort to those indicted, but nonetheless a sign that while the community stands poised to violent action, it has not yet fully committed to that
route. Undoubtedly the reluctance to commit fully is in large measure a
response to "our" law - an attempt, however flawed, to avoid punishment for criminal conduct under "our" laws.239
Some Common Law leaders have begun to articulate the steps that
would transform the words of the indictment into deeds, to detail the

commitment that these indictments embody. For example, the actingchief justice of the Ohio Common Law court, in announcing that his
court would soon start issuing indictments, said he would ask county
sheriffs to enforce subpoenas issued pursuant to those indictments.
If the sheriff doesn't respond, the local U.S. Marshals
Service will be asked. If that request is not honored, the
National Guard will be approached.... "If the National
Guard fails, then people have no place to go but to the
constitutional militia.... Yes, the militia are involved.
They are the last resort of enforcement for the common
law courts." 240

The Wisconsin Common Law court has declared that its orders will
be enforced "by militia protections vi et armis," Latin for "by force of
arms." 21 It may be that like the Ohio Common Law court, the Wisconsin
Common Law court intends to appeal first to the sheriff or to other State
institutions that carry arms and only upon refusal to the citizens' militia,
but the promise that law will be backed with force is clear. The graduated approach suggested by the Ohio Common Law justice is also reflected
by at least one member of the Common Law national "supreme court,"
Leonard Ginter,24 2 although his understanding includes a more violent
last move. He wants to start by getting "our" courts to enforce the
243
Common Law verdicts, but his vision includes other measures.
Go back to the time when somebody committed treason
years ago, most of them were put on a scaffold to
swing.... That's what we need to do. If we do about 10
of them, the rest will straighten out. It wouldn't necessarily have to be a judge or a governor. If one governor got
it, we wouldn't have any trouble with the rest. 244
"Most people involved with [Common Law] courts aren't inclined to
violence," one Common Law supporter reports.2 45 However, that observation, even if absolutely true, begs the question. "Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority act violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree of inhibition which
regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously."246 Thus, the question is not whether individuals in this movement have fewer inhibitions

toward violence than the rest of us, but whether the Common Law courts
will operate to disable those inhibitions.2 4 7 The question is whether this
law will "operate as a system of cues and signals to many actors who
would otherwise be unwilling [to commit] violent acts." 248
One powerful inhibition against committing violence is, of course,
that it begets violence. The violence that could be turned against this community by the State is formidable and the community is not oblivious to
that reality. Indeed, community awareness of the violence at "our" disposal accounts for the community's uncertainty about what to do next. On
the other hand, what is striking is the open flirtation with violent commitment expressed by this community's leaders.
Certain efforts to [maintain a separate nomos] have a
strange, almost doomed character. The state's claims over
legal meaning are, at bottom, so closely tied to the state's
imperfect monopoly over the domain of violence that the
claim of a community to an autonomous meaning must
be linked to the community's willingness to live out its
meaning in defiance. Outright defiance, guerrilla warfare,
and terrorism are, of course, the most direct responses.
They are responses, however, that may - as in the United
States - be unjustifiable and doomed to falure. 49
This community's law has just such a strange, violent and doomed
character. This law tells its people that they live "without" the United
States. 2 0 The "reality" envisioned by such law can be realized in two ways:
either the community resorts to guerilla warfare, a path doomed ultimately to fail, or it bridges the gap between the physical world and the
one envisioned by its law through some psychological leap, one that forces
members to live increasingly in a United States of the mind. In a sense
this law is following a dual trajectory: toward martyrdom and madness.
We now turn to examine those paths.
III. OfMartyrdom and Madness
"Martyrs insist in the face of overwhelming force that if there is to be
continuing life, it will not be on the terms of the tyrant's law."2" A martyr's suffering and death bear witness to the extant reality of the law for

which he dies and to the capacity of that law to withstand all the violence
that might be massed against it.2" 2 That, however, does not exhaust the
meaning to be found in the martyr's tale. Two archetypes of martyrdom
exist: martyrs who renounce violence and those who embrace it.2"
Martyrs who kill before succumbing convey a different message than
those who die praying. The Common Law community's martyrs do not
die praying.
Gordon Kahl"' was a farmer." He fought in World War II, earning a
Silver Star, a Bronze Star, two air medals, a presidential unit citation, nine
battle stars and two Purple Hearts.2 In the 1950's he was introduced to the
Christian Identity movement and became a follower.257 He also joined the
Constitutional party in North Dakota, a group that advocated Common
Law principles.258 In 1967, he wrote to the Internal Revenue Service to
inform it that he would no longer "'pay tithes to the Synagogue of
Satan...."""' In 1973, Gordon Kahl joined Posse Comitatus, a group that
endorsed, in large measure, the beliefs of both the Christian Identity movement and the Constitutional party.' In 1973, he reclaimed his Sovereignty
by renouncing his driver's license and his airplane pilot's license.'
In 1976, after Kahl appeared on television to urge others to stop paying taxes, the IRS charged him with willfully failing to pay income taxes
for 1973 and 1974.262 Kahl "refused to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty,
contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over him ... ,"263
Nonetheless, his lawyer made an argument recognizable under State Law:
he contended that Kahl was being prosecuted for having expressed his
2
views on television about the income tax and not for his failure to file. 6
Kahl was convicted. Addressing the court before it imposed sentence
upon him, Kahl spoke the language of martyrdom:
I felt I had a choice to make. I realized I could be cast
into prison here or I could spend an eternity in the Lake
of Fire. It seems to me that the choice of the two would
have to be whatever punishment I have to receive here.
2 65
That's all I have to say.
With those words, Kahl pronounces the supremacy of his law over
that of the judge and the inability of State violence to kill off his law. It
is, moreover, the martyr at prayer that these words suggest, the martyr
whose very submission to State violence mocks State law by demonstrat-

ing that all the King's horses and all the King's men cannot make the martyr honor the King's word as law. Kahl soon moved, however, to martyrdom's other theme.
Kahl was sentenced to one year in prison and five years' probation.2
While his case was on appeal, Kahl transferred ownership of his farm to
"Gospel Doctrine Church of Jesus Christ, Alter Ego of Gordon Kahl," an
attempt to fend off State law (the income tax) with State law (the exemption from taxation for religious institutions). This move is somewhat
more intelligible in "our" nomos than invoking the UCC as a boundary
rule: state law at least recognizes that the exemption relied on is relevant
to the question of State law at issue, whether Kahl must pay taxes. On the
other hand, the idea that individuals can be seen as religious institutions
that qualify for this tax exemption is different enough from State doctrine
to belie the patina of accommodation to State law otherwise suggested by
the move. Nonetheless, the move is nonviolent, as was Kahl's reaction to
the appeals court's upholding of his conviction; he entered Leavenworth
prison where he served eight months of his sentence. Kahl had not yet
moved to martyrdoms second mood.
As the story goes, Kahl's martyrdom began to change when he learned
that a friend - who had been imprisoned, like Kahl, for failing to pay
taxes after having appeared with Kahl on television - had died in
prison.2 , This other martyr had died of a heart attack, but Kahl believed
the government had induced the attack to silence the law both he and his
friend would speak." 8 After this Kahl is reported to have said:
I am satisfied that they [the government] consider me
enough of an enemy that if I ever went back to prison, I
would never come out alive. I can give up my religion or
I can stand and fight. I don't see any alternative.269
The martyr has made the transition to rebel. Rebels do not suffer violence for their law; they kill others in its name.
After his release from prison, Kahl continued to refuse to pay taxes.2 70
In 1981, the IRS seized his land.2 71 Then, the IRS tried to seize Kahl on
a misdemeanor warrant for having violated the conditions of his parole.272
For some time Kahl evaded the warrant. 273 Finally, federal and state officers set a trap for him on a road outside Medina, North Dakota. 274
Surrounded by armed officers, Kahl, backed by his adult son and two

friends, chose to fight rather than submit. A shootout ensued. In the end,
two men lay wounded, Kahl's son and a state officer, and two federal marshals had been killed. Kahl escaped.275
More dramatic, with the help of numerous fellow believers from
North Dakota and other Midwestern states, Kahl managed to evade capture for two and a half years. This feat not only mocks State law, it suggests State force can be overcome. In the end, however, the tale full circles
back to martyrdom. The State finds the rebel. As if intent on obliterating
even the suggestion that State power might be bested, the State goes all
out in confronting Kahl this last time. Forty law enforcement officials are
assembled to take Kahl. State force will triumph, but not before Kahl
manages one last act of bloody defiance. The doomed martyr manages to
shoot another State officer before meeting his own end. And what an end.
A dozen lawmen, ordered to wait [elsewhere] streamed
toward the house when they received word [that Kahl
had shot one of their own]. Together with the two SWAT
teams [one from the FBI and one from the U.S. Marshals
Service], they laid down a withering barrage of gunfire
and tear gas canisters that shattered the windows [of the
farm house sheltering Kahl] and left the concrete front of
the building pockmarked. One officer climbed to the
roof of the home and placed a can of diesel fuel over an
air vent, while another lawman shot two holes into the
can that allowed fuel to leak down the vent and into the
house. Soon flames were dancing amid the heavy smoke
and tear gas, and within minutes the house was ablaze.
For more than two hours the lawmen fired thousands of
rounds of ammunition into what had surely become
Kahl's funeral pyre....
... [When lawmen finally doused the flames and entered
the home], they found, near a chair in the kitchen, a
badly charred body, its legs and one of its hands seared off
by the extreme heat of the blaze. A mini- 14 rifle lay
2 76
underneath the body.

While being treated for his injuries, the lawman whom Kahl had shot
in this final face-off stated that he thought he had killed Kahl.2 That law7
man was right. Kahl was dead before the grand conflagration began.2 1
Kahl died rather than give up his law, but his final martyrdom was not
the martyrdom of prayer. The dead Kahl claimed one more victim: the
officer who killed Kahl died later of the wound Kahl fired in the last seconds of his life.279 Like all stories of martyrdom, this one promises that the
martyr's law can survive all the State's might. The martyr did not give up
his law. But it also promises something else, that the community's will to
violence can triumph over State might. All the King's horses and all the
King's men, yet Kahl's power to kill transcends even his death.
Some two hundred and fifty people traveled to Kahl's funeral in
North Dakota.280 They came from states as far away as Georgia, Iowa,
Texas, and Wisconsin. 21 ' The eulogy likened Kahl to various American
heros, among them Patrick Henry. Like Henry, Kahl had tried to warn his
2 2
fellow citizens that the tyrants were coming, the reverend explained.
Looking at the casket, he asked: "Is this here today mute and eloquent
evidence that the tyrants did come?"28 After the ceremony, one mourner
remarked that Kahl was "one of the greatest men since Nathan Hale and
George Washington."
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Kahl's myth; the story of Michael Hill, the chief justice of the Ohio
Common Law court, who was shot to death when he pulled a gun on a
law enforcement officer after being stopped for a second time for having
no license plate;" 5 and other tales like them, are important parts of this
communitys nomos. " These tales celebrate and affirm the use of violence
in the name of the Common Law and confirm the validity of the community's vision that the State is despotic. But they also teach that strong
commitment has a terrible price. Thus, while they serve as models for
other would-be heros, they remind less courageous souls that the State's
power is awesome and not easily defeated. As one of Kahl's mourners put
287
it: "He did what a lot of us would like to do, but don't dare to."
Of course, on "our" side of the wall, the fact that these tales inspire
even a small handful of like-minded heros is frightening enough. As the
Oklahoma bombing showed, it only takes a few committed people to
shake our world and our understanding of our place in it. Nonetheless,
these tales remind most Common Law adherents just how costly a commitment to violence can be. They give this law its doomed character and

push believers to bridge the gap between their world and ours with a
stretch of mind rather than a commitment of flesh. 8
That stretch of mind is evident in the Common Law nomos.As the Jews
of Safed elaborated a mystical world of Kabbalah when they could not manage to force God to send the Messiah to their physical world, this group is
busy constructing a world of their own on the Internet.2 8 9 Their United

States flourishes in this other dimension. One Common Law Internet entry
uses language that is virtually identical to that used by Professor Cover to
describe the psychological stretch made by the Jews of Safed:
Terra Libra ("Free Earth" in Latin) is a phenomenal societal breakthrough for taking advantage of the gap
between what is and what could or should be. Terra Libra
is a worldwide free country that extends across national
borders. It is an information-based rather than a territorial country. Its inhabitants are Free Sovereign Citizens. 290
Now such acts of "madness," acts which sever the psychological life
from the physical world may have "revolutionary potential. But such
movements, though they bring a Messiah, do not do so through law." 2 1 I
know too little about the Internet or this group's use of it, other than that
it is extensive, to be able to describe what kind of revolution it might
bring, but I can distinguish between changes wrought by technology and
those achieved through law. The atom bomb changed the world, but that
does not make it law.
On the Internet, this group can be "without" the United States. Their
United States can be realized in the physical manifestation of mental
space that is the Internet. It is interesting to note that Terra Libra stresses
"get rich quick schemes" and psychological discipline, not law, as the
means to "freedom."292 The "revolution" as imagined in Terra Libra is not
a revolution to be achieved through law. "At the end of the seminar, you
will walk away with an incredible feeling of ecstasy, knowing that you
really do have the power to be master of your own life - and take it
wherever you want to go."2 93 A seminar alumnus is quoted as saying he
wanted to "skip down the steps" after the seminar because he knew "we
are on the road to Individual Freedom that will take us anywhere we want
to go." 29' This path is spiritual, not legal. The Common Law has opened

two paths: one bloody, the other mad.

IV The Academy and the Common Law: a Tale of Commitment
Law is not art, and it is not literature. The judge who thinks he is
writing a chapter in some ongoing novel is an idiot. "The judges deal pain
and death. That is not all that they do. Perhaps that is not what they usually do. But they do deal pain and death." 29' To ignore that is to ignore an
essential part of law.
What responsibilities, if any, does law's violence have for we who sit
on the sidelines and write about what judges do and should do, what law
is and should be? "The transformation of interpretation into legal meaning begins when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and
' 6
through the personal act of commitment affirms the position taken."29
Along with Professor Cover, I celebrate the 1st Amendment's radical message that leaves each of us free to construct narratives of any sort, however potentially destabilizing those narratives are to the State. I do not write
to encourage others to write more cautiously about the law or to criticize
Oliver Stone for JFKor Nixon. Neither artist, nor legal scholar, nor judge
can ensure that the narratives she weaves will be interpreted just as she
would like by all hearers. But, unlike artists, those who write law spin narratives that imply that present commitment to these tales is warranted.
In that sense "legal interpretation.., can never be 'free."'297 If it is legal
interpretation, it must be "capable of transforming itself into action," 21
but, if that is true, then we who engage in this process of interpretation
along with judges and others have a responsibility to address what action
we intend our words to license and why. If the Constitution has been suspended, as Professor Gary Lawson, for one, has written, why shouldn't
citizens take up arms?2" It is not that I believe bands of racist militia
members will read the Harvard Law Review and get some pernicious idea
that they could not generate on their own. I don't. Rather it is that when
we write law without attention to the possible worlds that law would create, we deny the basic character of law. We take ourselves "out" of the
process of legal interpretation when we refuse to explore the implications
of our narratives. And we leave that work to whom? You may think you're
leaving that work to judges, whom you may believe share similar commitments to your own, but they are not the only group that speaks law.
If we listened more often to other creators of law, we might be able to
remember to think clearly and write clearly about commitments that

underlie the legal positions we assert. We might remember to consider
seriously the worlds our law writing might create and the actions that we
intend to license in the name of creating those worlds, as well as the
actions we intend to disavow.
Professor Cover has been criticized for choosing "his examples of
counternarratives careflly,' "o as if to imply that Cover tried to attract us
to non-state law by portraying it as necessarily better than the law of the
State. This is a misreading of his work. °'" At the end of Nomos and
Narrative,he wrote:
It is not the romance of rebellion that should lead us to
look to the law evolved by social movements and communities. Quite the opposite. Just as it is our distrust for
and recognition of the state as reality that leads us to be
constitutionalists with regard to the state, so it ought to be
our recognition ofand distrustfor the reality ofthe power of
social movements that leads us to examine the nomian
worlds they create.3 02
My recognition of the reality of the Common Law and my distrust
for it has caused me to examine the world it would create. In doing so, I
have seen how some of "our" constitutionalism has been used to support
this perverse nomian world. That in turn leads me to a new understanding of the constitutionalism we create. Yes, we should "invite new
worlds." And we should pay attention to the new worlds being born
around us. No legal world, including "ours," can ever manage a total
break with those around it. The Common Law not only shares narratives
that in some form are present in "our" world, it is affecting the very shape
of "our" official law. "Our" courts are responding to "their" law, and in
the process "our" law is developing.
In cases involving Common Law adherents, uour" courts are interpreting "our" precepts to shut down "their" law." 3 Courts have used the
precept in "our" law against the unauthorized practice of law to keep
"their" law from spreading, which changes the shape of that norm and
gives it new force and purpose.3" Courts have approved broad injunctions
that forbid Common Law adherents from filing liens without prior court
authorization.3"' Courts have even barred Common Law adherents from
persuading others through teaching them the Common Law that they

should not pay their income taxes."' The Seventh Circuit has upheld a
five year sentence of imprisonment imposed by an Illinois state court
against a Common Law adherent for threatening the life of a judge." 7 The
man's conduct consisted of a letter written to the justices of the Illinois
Supreme Court, whom the letter calls "Public Serpents" and "high and
mighty yo-yos. "308 The threatening language was:
I remind you again, that this 'Idiota Persona Non Grata'
[the circuit court judge] is of your problem and if is
allowed to continue to be mine, he will be executed as the
pending [here the Seventh Circuit inserted "warning?" in
brackets] to others as enemies of the Constitution and
Nation by his act of War... You had better nuffify [sic]
and countermand any of his demented orders or he will
be nullified for his criminal activities? °s
The Seventh Circuit found that the threat was:
ambiguous, but the task of interpretation was for the
jury, which did not take leave of its senses in concluding
that it really was a threat to kill the circuit judge if his
superiors did not rein him in and nullify his orders; that
it was not just the rhetoric of hyperbole that comes so
easily to the lips of angry Americans. ' °
The Court emphasized that the judge asked for protection from the
local sheriff
The fact that the victim acts as if he believed the threat is
evidence that he did believe it, and the fact that he
believed it is evidence that it could reasonably be believed
and therefore that it is a threat.... We add that the high
level of violence in this country, some of it directed against
public officials, warrants juries in taking such threats
deadly seriously.311
In other words, "their" commitment changes "our" law.32 According

to the Seventh Circuit, our legal understanding of what constitutes a
threat must be adjusted based on our perception that the commitment of
others within our society has escalated - not the commitment of the par-

ticular defendant mind you, but the commitment of people like him.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit justified the judge's imposition of the maximum sentence on the ground that those who "do not merely violate the
law, but flout it, can be expected to be punished more severely than persons who do not thus season their criminality with effrontery." Should
"our" law allow extra punishment for "effrontery?" Is this a constitutional understanding worth affirming?313
The cases on whether Common Law adherents may act as lawyers, the
injunction cases and the "effrontery" case 14 demonstrate how "our" rights
to speak, to petition the government, to use legal process and to advocate
in court are being shaped by confrontations with the Common Law.
Legislative efforts are also underway to meet the challenge posed by this
community's law.311 If we blind ourselves to the existence of other law, like
that of the Common Law community, we blind ourselves to how official
law grows and changes in response to the law generated by private groups.
By ignoring the strange law that has emerged around us, we risk losing
track of our own law. Surely, when judges begin to shape law to make it a
more effective instrument for suppressing divergent legal understandings,
it is a development worthy of scholarly attention and comment.
Equally important, I hope this journey into this strange and doomed
world of law serves to remind each of us of the importance of our own
commitments. What distinguishes the interpretations of legal academics
who tell stories similar to those told by Common Law adherents from
Common Law interpretations is the commitments of those academics:
the academics do not believe our government deserves to be brought
down by force, I assume, and do not celebrate dying or killing to help resurrect the Constitution they describe as "dead" or abandoned. When,
however, academics weave daring legal narratives, while leaving their
commitments unstated, the law they speak becomes less clear. Expressing
and elaborating commitment is an important part of speaking law.
Noticing the connections between the law we speak and perverse law that
repels us, should remind us of that.
One of the many attributes that elevates Professor Cover's contributions to law above those of his contemporaries is how careful he was to
make his commitments explicit. 311 In the last work to be published before
his death, he wrote:

Of course, I believe that every child has a right to decent
education and shelter, food and medical care; of course, I
believe that refugees from political oppression have a
right to a haven in a free land; of course, I believe that
every person has a right to work in dignity and for a
decent wage. I do believe and affirm the social contract
that grounds those rights. But more to the point I also
believe that I am commanded - that we are obligated to realize those rights."'
From first to last, he was careful to articulate his commitments when
he wrote law, when he spoke law, and when he taught law.318 He was clear
about the world his law was designed to create and affirm. Are you? And
what kind of world is it that you are committed to realizing?
Perhaps, if more of us had worked to build through law the world
Bob felt himself commanded to realize, a world in which the right to
work in dignity and for a living wage was guaranteed to all, the law that
.9
has grown in our heartland would not have found such fertile soil
Perhaps that thought is my madness. If so, perhaps, that is a madness
worth risking.
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that non-interactive groups were somehow Cover's models).

17

Estimates vary on the precise number of states with such courts. Michael Reynolds of the
Southern Poverty Law Center's Militia Task Force, which monitors this movement,
reports that these courts exist in at least 21 states: Katherine M. Skiba, "Renegade Courts
Issuing Threats," JournalSentinek October 29, 1995 (quoting Reynolds as confirming
that such courts exist in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,

18
19

20

21

Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota and Texas). They also exist in Wisconsin. See Richard W. Jaeger, "Militias,
Protesters Form 'Supreme Court' in Western Wisconsin," Wuconsin StateJournalJuly 1,
1995, which makes 22. Other newspapers have reported lower numbers. See, e.g.,
Michele Cole, "'Courts of Justice' Spring Up Across State," The Idaho Statesman,
December 15, 1995, at IA (at least 13 states); Thomas Heath, "A Law of Their Own,"
Newsweek, September 25, 1995, at 75 (at least 11 states); Mark Potok, "Common-Law
Courts Take on Legal System," USA Today, August 28, 1995, at IA (11 states). However,
my research has confirmed Reynold's much higher estimate, and indeed, as my citation
to the Wisconsin court demonstrates, I believe Reynold's count is, if anything, too low.
See, infra. text accompanying notes 37-47 on the origin of this movement.
Testimony on the Common Law movement has been presented in Congressional
Hearings: "Hearings of Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee,"
November 2, 1995. Legislation has been introduced in Wisconsin to respond to the rise
of Common Law courts. 1995 Wis. Sen. Bill 437.
"Moyer, 'We Cannot Ignore' Common Law Movement," Columbus Dispatch,September
22, 1995 (reporting that ChiefJustice Thomas J. Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court sent
a letter to Ohio judges asking them to report to him threats made against court personnel by Common Law adherents).
The endnotes in this article attest to the press attention this subject has received.
Moreover, as I contacted people to collect information about this movement and word
spread that I was writing on this subject, I had press inquiries on the subject from publications as diverse as The American Lawyer, The New York Times and Playboy Magazine.

22

While I have found numerous newspaper articles (many of which I will cite later) on the
private law I will describe, I have found no mention of this law or this communitys court
system in the law reviews. On the other hand, I have found some implicit criticism of
our inattention. "The legal establishment has been slow to react to the movement's
underground growth. American Bar Association officials are dimly aware of the movement but say they are confident that public education campaigns are the proper antidote." Stephen Braun, "Their Own Kind of Justice,' Los Angeles imes, September 5,
1992.

23

Id ("The details of Common Law ideology - as opaque and shifting as quantum theory - require hours of study.")
During my research for this article, I was encouraged by Mike Reynolds of the Southern
Poverty Law Center and Dick Jaeger of the Wisconsin State Journal to contact several
members of the Common Law community, who Mike and Dick thought would be particularly knowledgeable about the finer points of the group's doctrine. Both men assured
me that I would not be running any serious risks by contacting those they identified.
Having successfully collected original source material produced by members of the community, I decided that whatever additional information I could gain from contacting
community members directly was not worth the risk that I perceived in making such
contacts, assurances by Mike and Dick notwithstanding. I think of myself as relatively
brave, so I was surprised that I felt uncomfortable engaging in conduct that others undertook and had assured me I could undertake with relative safety. Having thought about
this, I believe that my reaction is directly attributable to the importance I attach to being

24

Jewish. I could not imagine speaking to these people without revealing that I was a Jew
and thus that I was particularly and personally offended by their anti-Semitic beliefs, but
I also could not shake the feeling that such a conversation would be risky to me, if not
physically at least emotionally. I did not call or write.
25

Cover, infra note 48 at 31.

26

Comments made by official judges who have listened to arguments based on this community's law demonstrate how preposterous that law looks in our legal world. See, e.g.,
United States v. Greenstreet, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 677, *14-16 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
1996)(describing a community member's arguments as "bizarre," "[of] absolutely no
legal value," and "irrational"); Peth v. Breitzmann, 611 F.Supp. 50, 54, 56 (E.D. Wisc.
1985) (describing some of plaintiffs' claims based on this group's law as "ludicrous" and
stating that "No reasonable person could seriously think that, for example, the revenue
laws can be avoided, and the government's tax collection efforts.., brought to a standstill
by the contention that wages are not income"); Terpstra v. Farmersand MerchantsBank,
483 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind. App. 1985) ("[T]he common denominator for all of the
issues before us is Terpstris filure to grasp the legal principles germane to this lawsuit").

27

See, infra, text accompanying notes 152-180.

28

UnitedStates v. Mosat 948 F.2d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 108
(1992); United States v. Schmitt 784 F.2d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 1986); GreenstreeA 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 677 *11-12.

29

Erin Hallisey, "Lien and Mean," San Francisco Chronicle,July 16, 1995.

30

See, e.g., Terpstra, 483 N.E.2d at 757 (declaring such liens "a nullity"); United States v.
Hart,545 ESupp. 470, 475 (D. N. Dak. 1982) (declaring these liens "fraudulent, void,
and of no force or effect"); Shutt v. Moore, 26 WashApp. 450, 455 (1980) (such liens
"invalid").

31

See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Greenstreet 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 677 *19 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
1996) (permanently enjoining Common Law adherent from filing liens against employees of the federal government without prior approval from a United States District
Court); United States v. Lutz, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9966 *8-9 (E.D. Ky. July 1, 1994)
(permanently enjoining filing of liens against employees or officers of federal government
without prior court approval); United States v. Brown, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17352 (D.
Ore. May 3, 1988) (same); United States v. Van Dyke, 568 F.Supp. 820, 822-23 (D. Ore.
1983) (same); North Dakota v. Jensen, 331 N.W2d 42, 47 (1983) (upholding injunction
that prevents defendant from "filing any liens that have no basis in law").

32

Almay, supra note 2 (explaining quiet title proceeding as understood in these Common
Law Courts). See also Handbook, Constitutional Court of We the People in and for the
United States of America, Our One Supreme Court, Common Law Venue, Original and
Exdusive Jurisdiction, A Superior Court Sitting with the Power of a Circuit Court and
United States District Court for the People in and for Franklin County, Ohio State
Republic, United States of America (Oct. 1995) [hereinafter Ohio Handbook] at 15
(urging people to file quiet title actions to expatriate themselves from federal and state
government control).

33

Almay, supra note 2 (noting also that two witnesses must swear to the birthplace of the
applicant).

34

Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 8.

35

See, e.g., Terpstra 483 N.E.2d at 757 (discussing quiet title action recognized in Indiana).

36

Mark Ballard, "Paper Terrorism," Texas Lawyer, December 18, 1995, at 1; Eileen
Dempsey, "Common Law Tactics are Condemned," Dispatch, December 9, 1995
(reporting that Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court labels these
tactics "soft terrorism").

37

Michael Reynolds explains that the common law courts first appeared during the farm
crisis of the 1980's. "All Things Considered" (National Public Radio), January 12, 1996.

38

James Corcoran, Bitter Harvest, Gordon Kahl and the Posse Comitatus: Murder in the
Heartland(New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), p. 39.

39

Id This seems a fitting place to acknowledge how indebted I am to Professor Corcoran.
Without his book, and the encouragement and help he gave me, I would not have been
able to write this artide.

40

Id, at 8-9.

41

Id, at 9.

42

Id

43

Id, at 10-11.
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Cover, supra note 4 at 206.
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Id
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Corcoran, supra note 38 at 11.

47

Id, at 40

48

Foreword: Nomos and
Robert M. Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Narrative," 97 HarvardLaw Review 4, 5 (1983) ("This nomos is as much 'our world' as
is the physical universe of mass, energy, and momentum. Indeed, our apprehension of
the normative world is no less fundamental than our appreciation of the structure of the
physical world").

49

See Braun, supra note 22; Potok, supra note 17.

50

Kriemelmeyer vs. defacto corporation state of Wisconsin, et al., (Edict from Our One
Supreme Court in and for La Crosse County, Wisconsin, U.S. of A. July 17, 1995) [hereinafter Kriemelmeyer Edict] (Common Law court papers on file with author); Braun,
supra note 22, at 1A (referring to Ohio Common Law Court as Our One Supreme
Court); TC. Brown, "Justice for the Common Man?," The Plain Dealer,December 11,
1995 (same).

51

The community's documents often refer to Black's Law Dictionaryas the source for definitions. The Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 6, states that Black's Law Dictionary
defines Common Law as follows: As distinguished from statutory law created by the
enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles and
rules of action, relating to the government and the security of persons and property,
which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or
from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such
usages and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of England.
In general, it is a body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as dis-

tinguished from legislative enactments. The "common law" is all the statutory and case
law background of England and the American colonies before the American revolution.
52 Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 9 (listing attributes of their United States and ours)
(on file with author).
53

Id

54

Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 1.

55

Id This remarkable document of 34 pages is filled with Biblical quotations. Most of the
document is dedicated to Biblical exegesis that purports to demonstrate that white
Americans are the people of Israel; America is the new "Zion;" women are subordinate
to men; "colored people," beasts of the field; and "jews," 'the descendants of Cain." See
also Public Notice, Wisconsin state, Country of Wisconsin, Common Law venue
Supreme Court, United States of America, Wisconsin state (organic), La Crosse county,
Trempealeau county et al., To: Office of Supreme Court clerk in Juneau County, June
13, 1995 (containing rules of Wisconsin Common Law Court and quoting from
Matthew 5:33-37) [hereinafter Wisconsin Rules], reprinted in ManawaAdvocate, June 8,
1995, at 2; and Citizens Rule Book (on file with author) (including on cover quotes from
Leviticus, Isaiah, Hosea, II Chronicles, and Acts, along with quotes from George
Washington and Edmund Burke); Braun, supra note 22 ("Court officers consult the
Bible as often as they flip through Black! Law Dictionary").

56 Wisconsin Rules, supra note 55, Rule 7. Another document from the Wisconsin
Common Law Court system proclaims that the court takes "judicial notice" of the following law. Magna Carta; The Holy Bible; "The common Law as existed in this country before the Civil War and contained within our national Constitution at that time;"
The Articles of Confederation; The Northwest Ordinance; The Negotiable Instruments
Law; and The Uniform Commercial Code 'in 'pertinent' parts." Civil Habeas Corpus
(non-statutory) by Precept in Affidavit Form, Frederick J. Kriemelmeyer, dated July 17,
1995 [hereinafter Kriemelmeyer Habeas].
57 Those rules do mention the Montana Constitution, specifically adopting as binding in
the Wisconsin Common Law Court "Article V, Section 26" of Montana's 1889
Constitution. Wisconsin Rules, supra note 55, Rule 23. Those rules also adopt the an
1864 statutory source for the format of pleadings. Id, at Rule 17 (adopting 'the Banna
[indecipherable symbol] Statutes of 1864, A.D., for pleadings as a format with special
expectations as granted by our Justices from time to time in purview of our Supreme
Court Rule 1"). I do not know to what statute this rule refers.
58

Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 9.

59 While the Ohio Handbook does not specifically define the term 'Basic Constitution,"
the Citizens Rule Book, supra note 55 at 25, denotes the first 10 Amendments as
"Common Law" and the remaining Amendments as "Equity Law," a term of derision
within this nomos. Further, the Citizens Rule Book distinguishes between the first 10
Amendments, which are labeled as "ratified," and the next 16 Amendments, which are
listed with a date preceded by either the word "adopted" (the 11th and 12th
Amendments) or the words "took effect" (the 13th through the 26th Amendments). Id
The Rule Book explains:
Took effect is used as there is a great deal of suspicion as to the nature of these

Amendments (common law vs. equity), also whether these last sixteen
Amendments are legal, how many were ratified correctly, do they create a federal constitution in opposition to the original, etc. For further studies a good
place to begin is with the article by the Utah Supreme Court on the 14th
Amendment, 439 P. 2d 266-276.

60

The Utah case referred to is a remarkable opinion in which Justice Elliet of the Utah
Supreme Court sets out his view that the 14th Amendment to the Constitution was not
validly adopted and thus is not part of the Constitution.
The Ohio Handbook begins with a copy of the first 10 Amendments to the
Constitution. Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 2-3.

61

See, supra, text accompanying note 53 (describing our United States derisively as legislative as opposed to judicial, i.e., one that operates with the Common Law as supreme).

62

See, infra, text accompanying note 65.
Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 14 (explaining that lawyers hold titles of nobility that
are recognized by official courts in violation of the Constitution).
The Ohio Handbook describes the communitys United States as embodying, inter alia
"The Basic Constitution, The First Ten Amendments (Bill of Rights); Three Branches of
Government... ; Article III Courts (Constitutional Courts); A Republic (Republican
form of Government of the 50 Union States) .... " Id, at 9.
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64
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67

68

69

Id,at 13.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
Id "The U.S. Supreme Court was ordained and established on September 24th, 1789 by
act of Congress when it passed a Judicial Act that created the U.S. Supreme Court and
ignored the Constitutional Court provided for in the Constitution."
The Ohio Handbook is of the "CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF WE THE PEOPLE IN AND FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA...." Ohio Handbook,
supra note 32 at 1.
On the cover of the Citizens Rule Book, supra note 55, readers are advised "The
Fireworks are in the Document itself: READ THE CONSTITUTION!" That book also
emphasizes that no law in conflict with the Constitution is valid. Id, at 7 (citing and
quoting, inter alia, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803).

70
71

Professor Cover noted that while "[iun our normative world, there is no obvious central text," the Constitution was "a center about which many communities teach, learn
and tell stories." Cover, supra note 48 at 25. He thus would not be surprised that the
Constitution plays an important, although not exclusive, role in this group's nomos. Id
(noting that "the Constitution must compete with natural law, the Declaration of
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Revolution itself for primacy in the
narrative tradition"). For this group, it must compete also with the Bible and Common
Law.
See, infra, text accompanying notes 147-149.
See Peter Larsen and Teri Sforza, "Common-Law Believers Go Their Own Way," Orange
County Register, May 18, 1996; Willson Cummer, "Jurors Convict Montville Driver
Who Doubts Laws," The PlainDealer,April 27, 1996.

72

Dennis B. Roddy, "Conspiracy Theories Are Group's Lifeblood," PittsburghPost-Gazette,
April 30, 1995 at, Al.

73

Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 23; Ohio Handbook, supranote 32 at 15. See also
text accompanying notes 152-170 (giving a complex legal justification for this position).

74

"If there existed two legal orders with identical precepts and identical, predictable patterns of public force, they would nonetheless differ essentially in meaning if, in one of
the orders, the precepts were universally venerated while in the other they were regarded
by many as fundamentally unjust." Cover, supra48 note at 7.

75

Id, at 5-9.

76

Corcoran, supra note 38 at 37 (describing how members of certain racist and antiSemitic groups associated with the law at issue here have attempted to disguise their
views to build a bridge to mainstream America and win converts more easily).

77

But see id, at 80 (describing the non-racist position advocated by some members of this
community in a setting that strongly suggests the non-racist views were sincerely held
and vigorously advocated).

78

Cover, supra note 48 at 11-12.

79

Id, at 12 ("The universalist virtues that we have come to identify with modern liberalism, the broad principles of our law, are essentially system-maintaining 'weak' forces").

80

"The unification of meaning that stands at [the center of a nomos] exists only for an
instant, and that instant [in which group members are completely united in their understanding of what must be done and why] is itself imaginary." Id, at 15. If the moment
of true unity is itself imaginary, the event in time that this moment supposedly occurred
might easily be imaginary too.

81

"[T]he very 'jurispotence' of such a vision threatens it." Id

82

Id

83

Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50.

84

Here I am using the term "white people" to mean Caucasian Christians and to exclude
all others, which is how I understand the term to be used in this edict. See, infra, text
accompanying notes 85-86.

85

E.g., Kriemelmeyer Edict supranote 50 at 3-4:
[T]he "Ammonite and the Moabites," which are a different race ofPeople to that
of the 'white race' Israel",.will never be able to enter into the assembly of the
Lord.
The one main issue is that this new iorm' of "man"[Adam] is separate from all
the other races....
Remember that the Bible was written for only one race of people....
E.g., id, at 6:
In the Jewish Talmud, Yebamoth 103a-103b, it says that the serpent "copul'ted"with Eve. ... [I]n Leviticus 20:15-16, "If a man lies with a beast, he

86

shall be put to death. If a woman approaches any beast and lies with it,
you shall kill the woman and the beast; they shall be put to death, their
blood in upon them." Here, most, if not all preachers of the Judeo-Christian
[preachers mixing the jew's laws (Talmud) with that of the Biblical Law]

churches will say that this means that man nor woman are to lie with a beast,
such as a cow, horse, etc., which is true, but this is not the 'beast' that our Lord
was talking about. It is the colored people, and the jews, who are the descendants of Cain, (Emphasis in original.)
87

Id, at 7-13. Justice Donald G. Montaban, of the Common Law Court, is shown to be
from the tribe of Dan. Id, at 15.

88

Id, at 17:
".. the four hundred and fifty prophets of Baal ... " represent our socalled congress and/or the state legislator [Satan] of today, creating and passing man made laws, regulations, codes, rules and policies under "color of
state law." ...

How many of the People of Israel [Adam/white race] have rejected the words
of Almighty God, and rejected their "faith" [surety] in Almighty God, to
worship man made laws; "color of law" .... (Emphasis in original.)
89

Id

90

Id, at 17-18:
Once you have applied for these benefits, via your "application forms," i.e.,
"social security card, drivers license, marriage license, etc., from your "new
gods," you have voluntary [sic] become their new "slaves," to "tax" at their
will, for you are no longer "Free," i.e., a "freeman." (Emphasis in original.)

91

Corcoran, supra note 38 at 38-39 (locating the roots of Christian Identity in British
Israelism and the roots of British Israelism in John Wilsons Our Israelitish Origins[ 1840]
and Edward Hines' Identification of the British Nation with Lost Israe). Corcoran claims
that a form of British Israelism is practiced today by the Worldwide Church of God. Id,
at 38 (stating that the Worldwide Church of God, established by Herbert Armstrong, is
the largest group of believers in British Israelism in the United States with a membership
of 80,000). While the Worldwide Church of God's version of British Israelism includes
the notion that those of European ancestry are the descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes of
Israel and thus God's Chosen People, its founder believed "Jews were entitled to grace."
Id See, generallv Michael Barkun, Religion andthe Racist Right (Chapell Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1994) (providing a detailed history of the origins of Christian
Identity and an analysis of how Identity replaced British Israelism's paternalism toward
the Jews with bitter anti-Semitism). It is the Christian Identity version of British
Israelism that is retold by the Common Law Court in Wisconsin.

92

Michael Reynolds explains that the common law courts are "closely aligned with the
militia movement and white supremacists" and "are partly based on a religion known as
'Christian Identity.'" See "All Things Considered," supra note 37. Leonard Zeskind, a
researcher and analyst for the Center for Democratic Renewal, an Atlanta-based group
that monitors racist and anti-Semitic activities in this country, states that the Christian
Identity movement has been able to create, what was heretofore lacking among competing and geographically separate American hate groups, "a practical working unity."
Corcoran, supra note 38 at 38 (quoting Zeskind). Michael Barkun, a professor of political science at Syracuse University and author of a book on religion and the radical right

93
94

[see Barkun, supra note 91] explains that while the radical right is made up of many subgroups ("[s]urvivalists, militias, Kans, neo-Nazis, Christian identity churches, skinheads
and Christian constitutionalists") their "views find their fullest expression in the
Christian Identity movement," which Barkun calls "the most significant religious manifestation on the extreme right." Michael Barkun, "Militias, Christian Identity and the
Radical Right," The Christian Century, August 2, 1995, at 738. See also John Kifner,
"The Gun Network," New York 7mes, July 5, 1995, at Al ("There is a common religious
thread, called Christian Identity, running through many of these groups ....
according to
studies by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and others").
See, infra, text accompanying notes 138-142.
See, e.g., Dennis St. John v. Tom Kocourek, acting sheriff, Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Manitowoc county Court, In the district court of united States of America,
Article III, Justice or panel, Common Law venue, original and exclusive jurisdiction,
Sitting with the powers of a circuit court in and for Manitowoc county, country of
Wisconsin, June 6, 1995 at 1 [hereinafter St. John Petition] (on file with author)
("Dennis St. John was born to Freeparents, as 'Natural born Free People" and therefore is
a Freeman Character, 'a state,' 28 U.S.C. 1251, and One of the United States, and he is
not a Federal Emergency citizen of the U.S. nor [of] any of 'its' subdivisions, statutes,
rules, regulation[s], tribunals, unrivaled benefits, contracts, agreements....") [emphasis
added].
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See, e.g., Id; Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 23.
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See, infra, text accompanying note 142.
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Ohio Handbook, supra 32 note at 9.

98

See, supra, text accompanying notes 32-35.

99

See, in/ra, text accompanying notes 214-220.

100 Of course, most of those other communities do not share the understanding of the Bible
presented above. Nonetheless, the fact that the source of law claimed by this community is one recognized by other communities gives the community an advantage both in
recruiting members and in gaining some sympathy from those in other communities
who place the Bible above official law, however different their particular understanding
of that document is. "The principles that establish the nomian autonomy of a community must, of course, resonate within the community itself and within its sacred stories.
But it is a great advantage to the community to have such principles resonate with the
sacred stories of other communities that establish overlapping or conflicting normative
worlds." Cover, supra note 48 at 33.
101 Id, at 26-40 (discussing insular and redemptive legal communities and contrasting
them). Professor Cover reserved the term "redemptive constitutionalism" for those
groups whose vision of reality and norms were radically divergent from those accepted
by the State's authoritative legal institutions to distinguish "redemptive communities
from "reform" movements. Reform movements are those that basically share the State's
vision of reality and norms but seek through State sanctioned means some correction in
the ongoing nomos, which group and State share. Redemptive movements seek radical
transformations: they view the world created by the State's ongoing nomos as unredeemed, construct a new nomos to take its place and are committed to the substitution.

Id, at 34. One can picture a continuum with reform movements at one end of the spectrum and redemptive movements at the other. But, at some point on that continuum,
there is a break between those communities that accept the State's law as law and those
that do not, having fully constructed a law that they believe exists and commands their
obedience and their resistance to that which the State mistakenly calls law.
102 Id, at 34.
103 Id, at 35.
104 Id, at 24.
105 Eugene Schroder with Micki Nellis, Constitution: Fact or Fiction (Cleburne: Buffalo
Creek, 1995), pp. 13-14. Mr. Schroder is the movement's most important legal scholar.
See, e.g., Eileen Dempsey and Jim Woods, "Outside the Legal system an Uncommon
Approach on Common Law," Columbus Dispatch, September 10, 1995, at 1A ("In June,
1,000 common-law supporters from 32 states gathered in Witchita, Kan., where they
heard Schroder [lecture on the Common Law]").
106 Schroder begins his book with a reference to this tale and places this "proof" befbre stories that suggest the illegitimacy of the current order began much earlier in our history.
Schroder, supra note 105 at 1, 25-86.
107 Id, at 26.
108 Id, at 26-27.
109 Id, at 24 (quoting Senate Report 93-549 on the continuing state of declared national
emergency).
110 Id
111 Id, at 2.
112 Id
113 Id, at 178 ("We have both the right and the duty to reclaim our country").
114 William C. Banks and Alejandro D. Carrio, "Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency
Powers in Argentina and the United States," 15 MichiganJournalof InternationalLaw 1,
45-46 (1993). William Banks is Professor of Law at Syracuse University and Alejandro
Carrio is Professor adjunto de elementos de Derecho Penal y Procesal at the University
of Buenos Aires, who was Visiting Professor of Law at Syracuse when this article was published.
115 For another example, an article by my friend and colleague, Jules Lobel, "Emergency
Power and the Decline of Liberalism," 98 Yale Law Journal1385, 1385 (1989), begins:
In 1987, The Miami Heraldbroke two major news stories.... [The first concerned] Gary Hart's sexual meanderings. The second revealed that Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) had drafted a contingency plan providing for the suspension of the
Constitution, the imposition of martial law, and the appointment of military
commanders to head state and local governments and to detail dissidents and
Central American refugees in the event of a national crisis.
The revelation that FEMA had drafted such an emergency plan attracted
much less public attention than Gary Hart's sexual adventures. Major news-

papers ...did not even run the FEMA story ...[and Congress did not investigate it in open sessions during the Iran-Contra hearings].
The FEMA plan may have failed to arouse attention because we have grown
accustomed to the substantial and steady increase in the scope of executive
emergency power during this century.
116 There are, however, some in "our" legal world that interpret these events as signaling the
end of constitutional government. For example, Professor Lawson of Northwestern Law
School speaks of these events as the death of constitutional government. Gary Lawson,
"The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State," 107 HarvardLaw Review 1231, 1233
(1994). Nonetheless, however similar Professor Lawson's narrative is on the surface to
that embraced by the Common Law community, that similarity does not place Professor
Lawson's work outside "our" legal world and within the alternative nomos I have been
describing. The Common Law narrative is embedded in a legal world that associates the
Constitution with the Common Law and the Common Law with the word of God.
Further, it is embedded in a legal world that ascribes the Constitution's demise to a conspiracy of evildoers who stand in opposition to "the people." None of this is part of
Lawson's narrative, which instead portrays the Constitution as a "choice" that may or
may not be "correct," and the New Deal "revolution" as one accepted by, and not
imposed on, the people. Id, at 1254. Both those aspects of Lawson's narrative ("choice"
and "acceptance") locate it within "our" legal world and outside the Common Law
no7foS.

Moreover, whatever the similarities in the narratives, the Common Law story is insistent on its prescriptive point, while Lawson's narrative is not. The former is thus "law,"
the latter, mere discourse. See, infra, text accompanying notes 189-191 (on the importance of commitment to law). The Common Law narrative demands commitment to a
course of action, redeeming the world. In contrast, Lawson's narrative forswears the
power to dictate what anyone should do. Lawson at 1253-1254 (pleading incompetence
on the question of what should be done and asserting that "only the best of moral
philosophers" can explicate what, if any, action is dictated by the tale told therein).
See also Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law
(New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 158-159 (explaining that the modem administrative
state born in the New Deal is unconstitutional, but refusing to sanction judicial activity
to restore the Constitution); Peter B. McCutchen, "Mistakes, Precedent and the Rise of
the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of Second Best," 80 Cornell
Law Review 1 (1994) (agreeing that the administrative state is unconstitutional, but
accepting that it is here to stay and advocating that the Court [and others] accept institutions, like the legislative veto, that approximate the "first-best" world, however unconstitutional they would be standing alone in that world, to create a "second-best" world");
Richard A. Epstein, "The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power," 73 Virginia Law
Review 1387, 1443-54 (1987) (arguing that New Deal legislation is unconstitutional, but
accepting that it is the result of "political forces," i.e., rejecting the Common Law position that the government has been hijacked).
Professor Epstein, a prolific and powerful writer, has contributed mightily to the literature, proclaiming the unconstitutionality of the present order. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1985) (arguing that the New Deal is inconsistent with princi-

pies of limited government and that the original Constitution would not support many
20th century reforms, such as zoning, rent control, and progressive taxation); Id., "A
Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation," 92
Yale LawJournal1357, 1357-58 (1983) (proposing that New Deal labor laws be replaced
by a common law regime of tort and contract).
117 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, "Constitutionalism After the New Deal," 101 HarvardLaw
Review 421, 448 (1987) (asserting that the New Deal "altered the constitutional system
in ways so fundamental as to suggest something akin to a constitutional amendment had
taken place").
118 But see sources cited supra note 116. As I explained in the note just cited, I consider the
narratives told by legal scholars like Judge Bork, Professor Epstein and Professor Lawson,
as narratives within "our" legal world as opposed to the "Common Law" world. Whether
those narratives can plausibly be described as "mainstream," however, is a much more
complex matter. Within legal academia, whether a narrative is considered "mainstream"
depends in no small measure on the credentials of the narrator. The credentials of the
academics listed above are formidable. I thus feel relatively comfortable suggesting that
within the academy their work is now considered within the "mainstream," while recognizing that others might think I use that term too loosely. Outside of the academy, however, I believe that "mainstream" is defined more narrowly. Or, at least, it was by many
at the time of Judge Bork's confirmation hearings.
119 See Lawrence Lessig, "Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory," 47
Stanford Law Review 395, 446 (1995):
By far the dominant view about the New Deal transformation is this: the
changes effected by the New Deal were certainly significant; relative to the
Constitution as interpreted for the fifty years before, they were certainly on the
level of a constitutional amendment. But, this view asserts, it was the
Constitution of the prior fifty years that was in error, not the Constitution
given us by the New Deal. Instead, the New Deal restored the original
Constitution, after a period of constitutional usurpation by an activist conservative Court.
See also Morton J. Horwitz, "Supreme Court Forward: The Constitution of Change,
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism," 107 Harvard Law Review 32, 56
("The victorious New Deal majority sought to portray its triumph not as constitutional
revolution, but as constitutional restoration."); Mary Cornelia Porter, "That Commerce
Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-Faire Court," 1976 Supreme Court Review
135, 140 ("[T]he Court returned in the early 194 0s to the principles of the Granger
Cases."); Stephen A. Siegel, "Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition," 70 North CarolinaLaw Review 1, 3 (1991) (discussing other
scholars' view of the Lochner era as a deviant period); Robert L. Stern, "That Commerce
Which Concerns More States Than One," 47 Harvard Law Review 1335, 1348-49
(1934) (describing the New Deal as Constitutional restoration).
120 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw (New York: Foundation Press,
1988, 2nd ed.), pp. 308-315; Lessig, supra note 119.
121 Bruce A. Ackerman, "The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution," 93 Yale Law
Journal 1013, 1056 (1984) ("Rather than a confession of legal sin.., the Court's capitu-

lation [to the New Deal was] the final point in the process of structural amendment. It
is the moment at which the judges recognized that a new constitutional principle had
indeed been ratified by the People"). For a more elaborate account of this theory, see
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991). See also Sunstein, supra note 117 at 447-78 and n. 114 (discussing Ackerman's
amendment theory).
Professor Ackerman's announced project is to replace the traditional narratives that
legitimize the adoption of the Constitution, the Reconstruction Amendments and the
New Deal, which he claims are "built on sand," with new and more solid legitimating
stories. Ackerman, We the People, at 44. According to Ackerman, "modern law-talk"
assumes that the Reconstruction Amendments "owe their legality to their conformity"
with the demands of Article V of the Constitution, a proposition he disputes. Id, at 42.
The traditional narrative on the New Deal, according to Ackerman, is the restoration
tale. Id, at 119. As explained by Ackerman, the restoration story goes like this: when the
Supreme Court finally accepted the constitutionality of the New Deal it restored the constitutional vision of Chief Justice Marshall (and the Framers) - a vision which had been
wrongfully abandoned by Justices who had "imposed their laissez-faire philosophy on the
nation through the pretext of constitutional interpretation." Id, at 42-43.
Just as the accounts provided by some conservative scholars share common elements
with the Common Law narrative [see citations supra note 116] so does Ackerman's
account. Indeed, in some respects Ackerman's account more closely parallels the important features of the Common Law world. For example, it is Ackerman, not the conservative scholars, who asserts that the Civil War Amendments are legally problematic in a
manner similar to the problematic New Deal legislation and who purports to judge the
Constitution's legality from the vantage point of the Articles of Confederation
[Ackerman, We the People, supra, at 40-50] -

all features of the Common Law nomos,

see, infra, text accompanying notes 136-142 (discussing Civil War Amendments), and,
supra,note 56 (listing Articles of Confederation as an important source of precept in this
nomos). Ackerman's narrative, which is intended as a new and improved defense of the
administrative state, is, of course, no more a part of the Common Law nomos than are
the accounts provided by conservative scholars. The point of his account is to mark the
New Deal and Civil War Amendments as lawful, not the reverse. Nonetheless, his very
undertaking suggests that there is room for considerable doubt about such matters. I
make that last point, not to condemn Ackerman's project, but to point out that doubting the legitimacy of the Civil War Amendments or the New Deal, central tenets of the
Common Law movement, are not in and of themselves proof that one lives in an alien
legal world.
122 In the Common Law nomos, The "People" is a powerful concept, both because it denotes
sovereignty and because it conjures the community as a separate entity. See, e.g.,
Kriemelmeyer Habeas, supra note 56 at 10-15 (beginning almost every paragraph with
"Our People," as in "Our People have notice and knowledge that Our People are born
Free and that there are no contracts where Our People have knowingly and willingly contracted their birthrights, state citizenship, or their Freemen Character away to anyone,
foreign, state, or government, or otherwise."); Citizens Rule Book, supra note 32 at 32
(reprinting the Constitution with an asterisk after "We the People," to note that:
"Originally, the Constitution had no title but simply began 'We the People'"). Moreover,

our" or "the" people resonates with the Christian Identity account that identifies the
movement with the "chosen" people. See, supra, text accompanying notes 84-87.
123 See, supra, note 116.

124 Schroder, supranote 105 at 31, explains the significance of the Bank Conservation Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1988), originally enacted in 1933 as an amendment to the
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b), as follows:

125
126
127

128

The American People were declared, in effect, to be the public enemy and were
made subject to the total war powers of the government. A constitutional dictatorship of total control over the economic and social agenda of the US was
established.
Ch. 1 § 3, 48 Stat. 1, 2 (1933) [current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1988)].
Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933).
This Act is central to the Common Law claim that the government is illegitimate. See,
e.g., Almay, supra note 2 ("The concept [underlying this group's law] is that the federal
government, by removing state's rights, have influenced all law by forbidding the people
to have a voice in government since parts of the Constitution have been suspended by
the bank act of 1933").
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b).

129 Schroder, supra note 105 at 28.
130 Id, at 28-29.
131 Id, at 32, 44-45 (describing Federal Reserve notes issued after March 9, 1933 as "emergency war script" that amounted to illegal seizure of "the people's gold"). For a mainstream narrative on Roosevelt's abandonment of the gold standard, see Kenneth W. Dam,
"From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American
Monetary Law," 50 University of Chicago Law Review 504, 509-512 (1983). Mr. Dam,

who was Deputy Secretary of State when he wrote this article, describes Roosevelt's
reliance on the TWEA to legitimize these acts as "dubious." Id, at 510. Thus, again we
find that the factual assertions at the heart of the Common Law narrative are not what
marks it as part of a different legal world. Rather, it is the manner in which these facts
are interpreted. Dam explains Roosevelt's actions as an effort to "increase domestic
prices, especially farm prices." The Common Law narrative instead portrays these acts as
intended to confiscate the people's property and reduce them to "serfdom." Schroder,
supra note 105 at 46. Moreover, Dam, who stops short of endorsing a return to the gold
standard but has many nice things to say about the virtues of gold, Dam, supra at 531,
sees the "polity" as standing in the way of returning to that standard, id, and not some
evil conspiracy in charge of the government and acting against the people.
132 See, infra, text accompanying note 134.
133 While the Bank Conservation Act takes center stage in the Common Law nomos; other
New Deal and post-New Deal legislation play important supporting roles. In his book,
Schroder goes through a host of New Deal measures to show how each contributed to
the federal government's wealth and control over the people. See Schroder, supra note 105
at 47-51, 66-80. Schroder then moves on to post-New Deal developments, demonstrating how presidents from Truman to Reagan have continued to invoke emergency pow-

ers to maintain illegal control over the people and to plunge the nation into war. Id, at
87-112, 141-164.
134 See, supra, text and accompanying notes 86-88.
135 The Declaration of Independence, which links established God-given and constitutionally promised rights, provides this community (and others) with a method of uniting secular and religious narratives. For that reason and because in our country the Declaration
is the text that legitimizes resistance to an established order, it is no surprise that that document occupies a revered place in the Common Law nomos. One text from this movement refers to three "original documents," the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, reprinting each of them in full. Citizens Rule Book,
supra note 55 at 1, 21. Another quotes liberally from the Declaration, pointing out that
the colonists had been "very patient," and "did not.., lightly" take the step of declaring
independence, and that some of the charges against King George can be made today
against the current regime. Schroder, supra note 105 at 13-14. For a discussion of
Lincoln's use of the Declaration to suggest the 'unlawfilness" of the lawful established
order that permitted slavery, seeGarry Wills, Inventing America:Jefferson's Declaration of
Independence (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. xvi-xxi.
136 The 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution.
137 See Citizens Rule Book, supra note 55 at 25 (referring to the dubious legality of these
amendments); Schroder, supra note 105 at 133 (describing the Civil War Amendments
as war amendments of questionable force during peacetime). For a mainstream narrative
that relies on the same facts to show that the fourteenth amendment was not ratified in
strict accordance with Article V of the Constitution, see Bruce Ackerman,
"Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law," 99 Yale Law Journal4 53, 500-10 (1989);
Ackerman, We the People, supra note 121 at 44-47. Professor Ackerman describes how
President Andrew Johnson encouraged the all-white governments of the Southern states
to reject the 14th Amendment, which they did. The Reconstruction Congress of 1866
then moved to replace those Southern governments with military rule, and allowed them
to rejoin the Union only upon their acceptance of the 14th Amendment. Ackerman,
"Constitutional Politics," supra at 500-507. Note, however, that the point of Ackerman's
narrative is not to deny the validity of these Amendments, but rather to use them to show
that the Constitution may be legitimately amended through procedures other than those
prescribed in Article V. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 121. His project casts doubt
on these Amendments and the administrative state born in the New Deal only to reaffirm the legitimacy of both.
138 The privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment is the clause that purportedly created this new class of citizenship. That clause states: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside." [U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1].
Mainstream narratives explain this clause as a repudiation of the Dred Scott decision,
which held that no Negro, free or slave, could be a citizen of either a state or the United
States, 60 U.S. [19 How.] 393, 404-05 (1857), intended to secure state and federal citizenship for the freed slaves. Tribe, supra note 120 at 356. In "our" legal world, the
Amendment did not "create" federal citizenship but only redefined it to cancel the
restrictive definition given in the Dred Scott case. Id, at 355-56.

139 Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 23 ("When this Nation was founded each of the
individual sovereign States of this Union has their own Citizens (Capital "C"), a.k.a.,
Freemen characters ... , but then came the so-called 14th Amendment, that added a second class of citizenship"); Ohio Handbook, supranote 32 at 9 (detailing characteristics of
two United States, one "Home of the 14th Amendment Slave;" the other, 'Home of the
Sovereign Human Being"). Compare Tribe, supra note 120 at 355-56 (explaining that
while the concept of United States citizenship was not defined in the original
Constitution, the document acknowledges the existence of such citizenship by referring at
various points to "citizens"). The Dred Scott decision similarly recognized the category of
United States citizenship as implicit in the original Constitution. 60 U.S. at 404-05.
140 Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 23; Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 15.
141 This mainstream narrative is known as the incorporation doctrine. It explains that prior
to the passage of the 14th Amendment, the Bill of Rights was interpreted by the Supreme
Court to protect persons from infringements only by the federal government. Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). After the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the
Supreme Court gradually read that Amendment's ban on the states denying persons due
process to mean that the states were prohibited from infringing rights guaranteed by
most, although not all, of the Bill of Rights.
142 Schroder, supra note 105 at 132. See also Laurie Goodstein, "Agents of God' Practice a
Christianity Few Would Recognize," Washington Post, May 20, 1995, at A12 ("'The
movement.., divides the nation's population between white 'sovereign state' citizens with
God-given inalienable rights, and non-white '14th Amendment' citizens with illegitimate 'Constitution rights'").
143 See, supra,text accompanying notes 55-86.
144 See, generall)4 Schroder, supra note 105 (providing many such tales).
145 Id, at 46 ("Farmers Enjoy New Status of Serfdom").
146 Id, at 77-78 (describing increase in federal land ownership and control during New
Deal); id, at 79 (describes adoption of "most favored nation" principle as further tampering with farm prices and imports); id, at 105-107 (describing government "control
over agriculture" from the 1970's until today as unlawful and designed to oppress farmers); id, at 130-131 (describing confiscation of cotton by Lincoln during Civil War).
147 See United States v. Kaun, 633 ESupp. 406, 412-415 (E.D. Wisc 1986) and UnitedStates
v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing the existence of these
narratives).
148 See Corcoran, supra note 38 at 51 (referring to this story and other stories popular in the
so-called tax protest movement).
149 I take this opportunity to emphasize that there are many important aspects of the
Common Law that I will not touch on in this article. For example, the importance they
attach to the jury system and to the concept of jury nullification, see, generall; Citizens
Rule Book, supranote 55, which is primarily devoted to this topic; the belief that lawyers
carry Tides of Nobility prohibited by the Constitution, see, e.g., Ohio Handbook, supra
note 32 at 14; the meaning of the missing and true 13th Amendment, which strips citizenship from persons who claim Tides of Nobility, see, e.g., Mike Lafferty, "Disaffected
Citizens, Trying to Take Law into Their Own Hands," Columbus Dispatch, December

17, 1995, at IA; and the significance of our abandonment of the gold standard, see
Schroder, supra note 105 at 29-46. I simply do not have space, nor do I possess the
knowledge, to cover all aspects of this complex legal world. My aim is more modest: to
present enough information about this law to give my readers a sense of the unredeemed
world that this law envisions, the 'redeemed" world that it would put in its place and
how it would get us from one world to the other.
150 See, supra, text accompanying notes 65-68.
151 The Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 13, demonstrates the connection between these
two narratives on the demise of the Common Law and the New Deal narrative, we have
just reviewed:
The U.S. Supreme Court was ordained and established on September 24,
1789 by act of Congress when it passed a Judicial Act that created the U.S.
Supreme Court and ignored the Constitutional Court [Common Law courts]
provided for in the Constitution. The Common Law Courts that were
[nonetheless] functioning in the country were dealt a fatal blow in 1938, five
years after the establishment of the War and Emergency Powers Act of 1933
[the Bank Conservation Act], which happened six years after the carefully
engineered collapse of Wall Street in 1927.
Notice that this story explains that the crisis, which provoked the New Deal, was manufactured, which reinforces this communitys interpretation of the New Deal as a coup
d'etat by trick as opposed to a program supported by the people.
152 Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

153 Erie appears in every leading textbook on civil procedure. It has also been the focus of far
too many law review articles to list in this footnote.
154 See Akil Amar, "Law Story," 102 HarvardLaw Review 688, 696 (1989) (explaining that
Erie is a "rich" case that supports many different readings).
155 See "The UCC Connection: Free Yourself From Legal Tyranny," 4-5 (1990) (condensed
transcript of tapes of seminar given in 1990 by Howard Freeman) (on file with author).
156 304 U.S. at 78.
157 See, e.g., Citizens Rule Book, supra note 55 at 24 (labeling Bill of Rights, "Common
Law" amendments).
158 See, supra, text accompanying note 54.
159 See, e.g., GuaranteeTrust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-102 (1945) (explaining that Erie

changed the relationship between state and federal law).
160 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries* 40.
161 Swiftv. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
162 By this assertion I do not mean to suggest that one must accept this as the "true" story
of Erie. I mean only that this is one quite plausible account of the case, an account that
is indeed retold by those in "our" legal world. See, e.g., William Casto, "The Erie
Doctrine and The Structure of Constitutional Revolutions," 62 Tulane Law Review 907
(1988) (describing Erie as the culmination of a revolution by legal positivists, a devastating repudiation of Blackstone's natural law view). Cf., Mortin Horwitz, The
Transfrmation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1979) (insisting that Justice Story was a legal positivist when he wrote Sudft the language
of the opinion notwithstanding).
163 Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 9.
164 304 U.S. at 78. The full quote from Erie is "Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State." d But, as we have seen, this community believes that the Constitution was suspended by 1938 when Erie was decided. See, supra, text accompanying notes 106-113.
Thus, the "except" language is empty for them, particularly in that, at most, it leaves federal legislation as a valid ground for decision in addition to "the law of the State" and legislation of any kind is man-made law, which should be subservient to God's law, the
Common Law.
165 While mainstream narratives do not track this story, in "our" legal world Erie has been
interpreted as consistent with the Court's endorsement of New Deal legislation and thus
a part of the triumph of, at least, the federal legislative branch over the courts. See, e.g.,
Amar, supra note 154 at 698 (explaining Herbert Wechsler's reading of Erie and other
readings consistent with Wechslers). These mainstream narratives compete with those
that picture Erie as a counterweight to the federal activism of the New Deal, and those
that picture Erie as affirming a place for federal common law, see, e.g., Martha Field,
"Sources of Law- The Scope of Federal Common Law," 99 HarvardLaw Review 833
(1986), and Thomas W. Merrill, "The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts," 52
University of Chicago Law Review I (1985).
166 See Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 9 (directly contrasting a "Republic" guaranteed by
the Constitution to each state with the existence of "legislative courts" and a "legislative
democracy").
167 "The UCC Connection," supranote 155 at 4.
168 304 U.S. at 69.
169 Id ("The District Court had decided on the basis of COMMERCIAL (Negotiable
Instruments) LAW, that this man was not under contract with the Erie Railroad, and
therefore he had no standing to sue the company.") The district court had, in fact, decided that Pennsylvania law (requiring priviry of contract) did not govern but that the common law did, which extended liability to foreseeable pedestrians. Fleming James, Jr. and
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1985,
3rd ed.), § 2.35 at 118.
170 Id, § 2.35 at 118.
171 Id, § 2.35 at 118-119 and n.5 (discussing the connection between the two and noting
that the literature on the connections is "voluminous").
172 Id, at 119. At this point, the mainstream narratives diverge, providing various interpretations of what this switch signifies.
173 Ohio Handbook, supranote 32 at 13. This fact is also accepted in our legal world (albeit
with the caveat that the right to jury trial was retained for suits formerly "at law"), James
and Hazard, supra note 169, § 1.8 at 21, although it is not interpreted in the same way.
174 Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 13-14 (equating "actions at law" with the Common
Law).

175 Id, at 14:
The founding fathers gave us three types of law to adjudicate a dispute under,
and the ability to chose [sic] what law to grant jurisdiction to hear the case, Law
(Common Law) Equity, and Admiralty for contract cases. In 1938 your ability
to choose was taken away, as we were placed under contract, under Admiralty
law, thru your social security number and driver's licenses, and all cases heard
in the courts today are heard under Admiralty, even though most cases do not
pertain to disputes about shipping or commerce on the navigable waterways.
176 This is a central piece of dogma in the Common Law world. See, e.g., Ohio Handbook,
supra note 32 at 14 ("[A]ll cases heard in the courts today are heard under Admiralty");
Kriemelmeyer Habeas, supra note 56 at 14 ("describing courts, presumably federal and
state, as "admiralty courts"). Moreover, these and other Common Law sources suggest
that the community considers state courts to be admiralty courts along with the federal
courts. See also "The UCC Connection," supra note 155 at 8. Presumably, the admiralty label extends to the state courts because state procedural codes mirror the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and because in Erie "State law" was "acknowledged" to be other
than the Common Law. See, supra, text accompanying notes 164, 166. See also "The
UCC Connection," supra note 155 at 8 (explaining that "Colorable Admiralty is now
known as STATUTORY JURISDICTION) [emphasis in original].
177 See, infra, note 178 (quote explaining that these changes were made without knowledge
of the people).
178 The Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 13. The Ohio Handbook provides a succinct
summary of the Common Law narrative on the revolution of 1938:
The U.S. Supreme Court was ordained and established on September 24,
1789 by act of Congress when it passed a Judicial Act that created the U.S.
Supreme Court and ignored the Constitutional Court provided for in the
Constitution. The Common Law Courts that were functioning in the country were dealt a fatal blow in 1938, five years after the establishment of the War
and Emergency Powers Act of 1933, which happened six years after the carefully engineered collapse of Wall Street in 1927.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reveals this fact on page 17, under the
1966 Amendment clause where it states, "Just as the 1938 rules abolished the
distinction between actions at law (common law) and suits in equity, this
change (the 1966 change) would abolish the distinction between civil actions
and suits in admiralty. By a stroke of the mighty pen the common law, equity
law was abolished without the knowledge of the people.
Id
179 I say "federal" courts in the text to simplify this story and make it more comprehensible
to those steeped in "our" legal world. In "our" world Erie expands the scope of State law
but does not change (or announce a change in) its nature. To us, Erie is a decision that
changes federal law and the Federal Rules, while greatly influencing state procedure, are
federal rules. Thus, the idea that together those two events changed the nature of state
court jurisdiction is even harder to digest than the idea that they transformed (or marked
the transformation) of the federal courts into admiralty courts. Nonetheless, in the

Common Law world, as far as I can discern, the events of 1938 signalled the transformation of the state courts into admiralty courts along with those of the federal government. See, supra, note 176.
180 See, e.g., Kriemelmeyer Habeas, supra note 56 at 14 ("[T]he alleged courts today are in
fact Military tribunals, flying the gold-fringed flag. That flag sets the jurisdiction of the
tribunal as inland admiralty and maritime tribunals of contract law [as opposed to
Common Law]").
181 See, e.g., Banks & Carrio, supra note 114; Lobel, supranote 115.
182 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 116.
183 See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People, supra note 121.

184 See, e.g., Casto, supra note 162.
185 Here I am alluding to the work of Owen Fiss and Stanley Fish, who have each emphasized the role this community of elites plays in the intelligibility of law. See, e.g., Stanley
Fish, "Fish v. Fiss," 36 Stanford Law Review 1325 (1984); Id., "Interpretation and the
Pluralist Vision," 60 Texas Law Review 495 (1982); Owen Fiss, "Conventionalism," 58
Southern California Law Review 177 (1985); Id., "Objectivity and Interpretation," 34

Stanford Law Review 739 (1982). See, generall Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) (elaborating the concept of interpretive
community, which was then borrowed by Professor Fiss to explicate the judicial process).
My use of this phrase should not, however, be taken as implying any sympathy with
the idea that the interpretive community of legal scholars, judges and lawyers has some
exclusive right to have their interpretations called "law" that should be denied to other
interpretive communities. On that question, I am with Professor Cover, who criticized
Professor Fiss' attempt to privilege the interpretation of judges as law of presumptive
moral worth and, as such, presumptively entitled to our obedience. Cover, supra note 48
at 43-44 (criticizing Fiss' argument on the special moral authority of judicial pronouncements). See Fiss, supra, "Objectivity and Interpretation," at 755-56.
186 Cover, supra note 48 at 33.
187 Id
188 Id
189

Rules and stories alone (literature, history), while essential to normative discourse, are to be distinguished from law because they do not license transformations of reality through the use of force. Law does. Law is rules and stories
anda commitment of human will to change the world that is into the world
that our rules and stories tell us ought to be. This commitment to realize the
"ought" distinguishes law from utopian vision, literature and history. It also
accounts for the connection between law and violence. Both metaphorically
and literally, law entails violence: to insist on one normative vision is to be
willing to kill off alternative visions and, if necessary, those who adhere to
those visions or who idiosyncratically fail to conform.
Susan P. Koniak, "The Law Between the Bar and the State," 70 North CarolinaLaw
Review 1389, 1403 (describing Professor Cover's jurisprudential vision).

190 Cover, supranote 48 at 53.

191 Koniak, supra note 189 at 1460-1478.
192 Cover, supra note 48 at 49.
193 Such groups may ultimately make important contributions to legal meaning. Their
actions may become the center of a new legal order, a founding narrative around which
a new world of law develops. But that is a different process than the one we are concerned
with here. Here, the group already has law and the question is what resistance to the state
that law sanctions. See Cover, supra note 48 at 50 n.37 (contrasting these two phenomena).
194 Id
195 That distinction is common to law maintained without a State. State law defines itself by
its near-exclusive license to use force to insist that people do what the law "requires."
Thus, it is natural for State law to speak in imperatives when it means to communicate
a requirement or prohibition. Moreover, when the State fails to speak in imperatives
(given its license), it is reasonable to assume that its commitment to the law in question
is weak. Because private groups, unlike the State, maintain their law primarily through
the celebratory obedience of members, as opposed to "enforcing" it upon them [see
Cover, supranote 48 at 12-16) they typically express "requirements" as insistent "oughts,"
which can be distinguished from noble but terribly demanding "oughts," which are not
"required." For a somewhat more detailed elaboration of this point, see Koniak, supra
note 189 at 1481-82.
196 The moves members 'should take now" are the equivalent of "required" moves in groups
that maintain law without a State. See, supra, note 195.
197 This, of course, refers to the events of 1938: Erie and the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See, supra, text accompanying notes 152-180.
198 As we have seen, these terms are used interchangeably in the Common Law.
199 Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 17-18, 23.
200 Id, at 17-18.
201 Roddy, supra note 72 (describing theory on driver's license and right to travel); 20/20,
ABC Television, 9:00 pm, January 5, 1995 (same).
202 References to the UCC abound in Common Law Documents. See "The UCC
Connection," supra note 155; Ohio Handbook, supra note 32 at 12; Kriemelmeyer
Edict, supra note 50 at 33.
203 "The UCC Connection," supra note 155 at 5-7.
204 Comment to U.C.C. § 1-207.
205 Id
206 See Memorandum to ChiefJustice Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court, re: Common Law
Court, dated October 25, 1995 [hereinafter Moyer Memo] at 6 (explaining that rarely
do Common Law adherents sign their names without citing this section or stamping on
the document 'without prejudice) (on file with author). See also Kiemelmeyer Edict,
supra note 50 at 33 ("'Without prejudice' with explicit reservation of all unalienable
Rights, waiving none, 'without recourse'") (citing § 1-207); "The UCC Connection,"
supra note 155 at 25-26 (explaining the importance of making a reservation under § 1207 when appearing in "our" courts).

207 The Common Law community also makes extensive use of UCC § 3-501. See Moyer
Memo, supra note 206 at 7. That section allows a party to refuse payment of a negotiable
instrument if it lacks a necessary endorsement or otherwise fails to comply with the terms
of "an agreement of the parties, or other applicable law or rule." The community uses
that section in responding to State court process of any kind, particularly traffic tickets.
Id The community's argument is apparently that its members have reserved their rights
not to be bound by the State's statutory courts and thus the presentment of process is not
in compliance with the agreement between the parties.
208 Cover, supranote 48 at 27-29.
209 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-81 (1972) (describing the reporters argument, which was rejected by the Court, that the 1st Amendment protects journalists
from having to reveal their sources to a grand jury); Brief for Amici Curiae Advance
Publications, Inc. et al. at 11, Cohn v. CowlesMedia Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (No.
90-634) (arguing that the 1st Amendment prevents a source from suing a reporter for
breaking a promise to keep the source confidential, an argument rejected by the Court,
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516); Brief for Amicus CuriaeAssociation of American Publishers,
Inc. at 7, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N. Y State Crime Victims Bd, 112 S.
Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (arguing that the 1st Amendment protects the press and
authors from laws prohibiting publishers from paying - for writing the stories of their
crimes - those who have been convicted, accused, or who admit having committed
crimes); "Facts on File," World News Digest 748 A3 (1976) (describing Daniel Schorr's
nine refusals to answer questions about his sources posed by a House Ethics Panel and
quoting Schorr's explanation that his silence was based on "professional conscience as
well as [the First Amendment, freedom of the press] constitutional right") [brackets in
original].
210 See Koniak, supra note 189 at 1453-55.
211 I do not mean that a group "accepts" State law when it argues for a right to be left free
of it based on a precept accepted by the State. I mean it accepts the precept. That, however, is not the same as accepting what the State says the precept means: the State's narratives about the precept. The group typically argues that the State should accept the
group's understanding of the State's precept, i.e., that the precept is a boundary rule that
prevents State law from trumping the group's law in the particular context at issue. See
Cover, supra note 48 at 26-28 and n. 85 (describing the Mennonite understanding of the
1st Amendment as a boundary rule).
212 "Generally, [t]he... self-referential supremacy of [a group's legal system and the State's]
is... mitigated by the partly principled, partly prudential rules of deference that each
manifests in relation to the other." Cover, supra note 48 at 30. The self-referential
supremacy of the Common Law is such, however, that its prudential rules of deference,
such as appealing to the UCC as a means of fending off State law, are not perceived as
deference by the State, but as defiance. The group shows deference to State law that the
State does not acknowledge applies. That is a deference which is designed to fail. I
nonetheless call it deference because it is not the community that holds the UCC sacred.
The community insists that it is the State that, however wrongfully, holds the UCC
sacred, so it uses that otherwise unworthy source of law to speak to the State.
213 For a Common Law "hero's" response to a routine traffic stop, see, infra, text accompa-

nying note 285.
214 Hallisey, supra note 29.
215 See, e.g., Larson and Sforza supra note 71 (noting that judges are frequent targets of liens
filed by common law believers).
216 See, e.g., Testimony of Nickolas G. Murnion, County Attorney of Garfield County,
Montana, Crime Subcommittee of House Judiciary Committee, November 2, 1995
(describing lien filed against him for failing to prosecute the Farmers Home
Administration for fraud).
217 Michele Cole, "'Courts of Justice Spring Up Across State," The Idaho Statesman,
December 15, 1995 at Al (reporting that such liens have been filed against the Mayor
and City Council of Boise, among others).
218 Ballard, supra note 36 (describing such liens as "ticking time bombs"):
After getting the document past a clerk, the person seeking the lien can get an
official abstract of judgment from the district clerk, which legitimizes the document. The lien can sit unnoticed for years, a time bomb waiting to explode
when the person tries to sell the property.
Id
219 See Hallisey, supra note 29 (stating that process to remove liens is often costly and timeconsuming).
220 Ballard, supra note 36.
221 I reproduce here an example of a typical Common Law quiet title notice, omitting the
Sovereigns name:
A quiet title has been received and filed for [name], Leist, Sovereign, private,
personal and real property in "Our One Common Law supreme Court in
Manitowac county, Wisconsin state republic. Demand is hereby made upon all
persons, people or entities to produce a title believed to be a superior title, or
lose any and all interest in the private property of [name]. Anyone with a superior title or interest pertaining to the above named may request a copy of the
Quiet Title at the cost of $5.00. Responses should be mailed Registered Return
Receipt Mail to [name/address], Wisconsin state, united States of America
'without" the U.S., so attest by Peers in Common Law, nunc pro tunc.
DATE POSTED Feb. 6, 1996.
(originals on file with author).
222 See, supra, text accompanying notes 32-35.
223 See, e.g., Potok, supranote 17 (describing officials of the Cherokee, Oklahoma Common
Law court, 'one of the earliest and largest in the nation," as "still working out how to
enforce [the court's] findings").
224 Cover, supra note 48 at 40-41 (describing how, inter alia, Aeschylus' Oresteia and The
FederalistPapersjustify the creation of a court by appealing to the need to choose between
competing laws).
225 Cover, supra note 14 at 201 (describing this incident).
226 Id

227 Id (quoting letter from DeGaulle to Sartre).
228 Potok, supra note 17 (reporting that in Montana members of the Common law court
occupied a courthouse and offered $1 million dollar bounties for the arrest of local officials and quoting Rex Davis, former head of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms describing these courts as "a real breakdown of law and order," and as similar to
terrorist courts in the Middle East, which have conducted executions).
229 Almay, supra note 2 (describing Common Law practice of inundating "our" courts with
piles of meritless papers and the strain that places on our legal system). Brown, supra note
50 (describing the concern of Chief Justice Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court with the
demand Common Law courts place on Ohio state courts through multiple Common Law
filings); Heath, supra note 17 at 75 (describing nuisance filings inundating our courts).
230 Martha A. Bethel, "Terror in Montana," New York imes, July 20, 1995, at 23.
231 Id He called his appearance a "special visitation," but it seems clear that he was trying to
enter what in "our" world is called a "special appearance" to contest jurisdiction.
232 Id
233 Almay, supra note 2 (reporting on threats against Ohio judges and on one Ohio judge
who has requested and received police protection for himself and his family); Skiba supra
note 17 (reporting on threats against Montana judges).
234 See, e.g., Potok, supra note 17 (quoting Mike Reynolds on the "flurry of indictments of
federal, state and local officials" now being issued by Common Law courts); Almay, supra
note 2(testifying that the Ohio Common Law court has indicted all members of the
Ohio Supreme Court for treason); Brown, supra note 50 (reporting that Common Law
courts have indicted about twenty federal judges nationwide).
235 The uncertainty about precisely what commitment these indictments imply has, apparently, caused some Common Law courts to put off issuing them. Potok, supra note 17
(reporting that most "rightist leaders won't publicly back the indictments" because it is
"too early to take that step").
236 In "our" world, these indictments are assuredly seen as threats. One state court judge said
of the indictments: "[W]hen you hear about things like indictments, you wonder what
they will do to enforce these things. All judges who have heard of this have some concerns." Brown, supra note 50 (quoting Jon R. Spahr, chairman of the Ohio Judicial
Conference and a judge in the County Common Pleas Court).
Deputy U.S. marshals in San Francisco routinely monitor courtrooms where
Common Law advocates are defendants in tax trials. Marshals began guarding the judge
and jury overseeing one criminal tax case after they were sent treason indictments from
a Common Law court based in Tampa, Fla. They had good reason: several times, extremists dressed as federal marshals stood up in the courtroom and attempted to serve papers
on court officers and jurors.
Braun, supranote 22.
237 "In the Common Law lexicon, treason is an all-purpose charge, often used when public
officials ignore [Common Law] court dictates." Id, at 22.
238 One such indictment, entitled Public Notice of Treason, and issued against an Ohio state
court judge reads in relevant part:
The person whose name and address appears at upper right, has accused you,

the addressee of an act ofTREASON against the United States and WE THE
PEOPLE. That act is briefly stated herewith for public viewing:
The accused allowed a police agent to act as an Officer of the Court.
The accused entered a plea without the accuser's consent.
Denying the accuser due process of law.
Treason is defined in 18 USC 2381: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the
United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them
aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and
shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned ... "This applies to ALL U.S. citizens!
[citations to Constitution and Treason Act passed by first Congress omitted]
If acts of treason against WE THE PEOPLE go UNreported and
UNpunished, it breeds CONTEMPT FOR THE LAW and encourages repeat
performances....
Those who love America cannot and will not let this happen!!!
YOU, the accused, are put on notice by this document that You act(s) of
treason are now a matter of public record.
Your accuser has the legal obligation to make your act(s) of treason known
to government officials (18 USC Section 4 to invoke due process) and to formally document this accusation by affidavit. Further, your accuser has the
moral responsibility to inform fellow citizens by posting this notice in PUBLIC PLACES.
The public is invited to contact the accuser to learn more of treason. AN
ACT AGAINST ONE IS AN ACT AGAINST ALL AMERICANS and such
acts should NEVER, EVER, go UNPUNISHED.
May God have mercy on you the accused, if convicted.
Date Dec. 26, 1995.
Indictment of Judge (name omitted by author) by (name omitted by
author), Dated December 26, 1995. This document is a form document in
which the second paragraph is filled in by the accuser, who also fills in the
accused's name and address and his own (document on file with author).
239 I say "flawed" because the conditional nature of a threat does not remove it from the
reach of criminal law. See United States v. Schneider, 910 E2d 1569 (7th Cir. 1990)
(upholding conviction of Common Law adherent for conditional threat against state
court judge), discussed, infra, text accompanying notes 239, 307, 311.
240 Brown, supranote 50 (quoting Bill Ellwood, acting chief justice of the Ohio Common
Law court).
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Wisconsin StateJournaZJuly 1, 1995, at 2D.
242 Leonard Ginter served five years in prison for conspiracy and harboring a fugitive. Potok,
supra note 17. The fugitive Ginter harbored was Gordon Kahl, a hero in the Common
Law community who killed and in turn was killed (in Ginter's home) for the cause. See,
infra, text accompanying notes 253-284. While the concept of a national Common Law
court strikes me as oxymoronic, I trust that there is some story that makes this sensible
under the community's law. Ginter is one of 23 justices on this court. Potok, supra note
17. See also Bill Simmons, "Arkansas Man Awaits Takeover of Courts, The Commercial

Appeal," May 7, 1995 (describing Ginter's role on Common Law supreme court and in
Kahl case).
243 Potok, supranote 17.
244 Id (quoting Leonard Ginter). See also Murnion Testimony, supra note 216 (relating how
Common Law constable envisioned process against State officials: "[We would be tried
by a jury composed of Freemen and if convicted the penalty would be death by hanging," to save taxpayer money the hanging would be from a bridge instead of a gallows).
245 Brown, supra note 50 (quoting Alfred Adask, publisher of the Dallas-based AntiShyster
magazine, a Common Law related publication).
246 Robert M. Cover, "Violence and the Word," 95 Yale Law Journal 1601, 1615 (1986).
247 Id, at 1614 (describing psychologist Stanley Milgram's famous explanation of the 'agentic state" and how it changes one's willingness to inflict pain on others). See Stanley
Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
248 Cover, supranote 246 at 1628.
249 Cover, supranote 48 at 52.
250 See, e.g., Kriemelmeyer Edict, supra note 50 at 1 (referring to address of Common Law
court as being "without the United States").
251 Cover, supra note 246 at 1604.
252 Id, at n.9 ("Martyrdom fuinctions as a re-membering when the martyr, in the act of witnessing, sacrifices herself on behalf of the normative universe which is thereby reconstituted, regenerated, or recreated").
253 See, id, at 1604, 1605 n.9 and n.11 (contrasting the submission to suffering in 2
Maccabees 7 with the dramatic killings of those enforcing the State's law in 1 Maccabees
2).
254 Gordon Kahl is just one of the Common Law movement's heros. See, e.g., Stumpe,
Extremists Write 19 in Red on Calendar (describing other heros of the extreme right
along with Kahl). But Kahl appears to be one, if not, the earliest of this community's
martyr-heros. See "The Prequel to the Oklahoma City Bombing," Business Wire, April
24, 1995 (explaining how Kahl's story is generally viewed as the start of the "bloody trail
of right-wing extremism"). James Corcoran's book Bitter Harvest supranote 38, is devoted to Kahl's story as is the movie Death and Taxes. See Corey Williams, "AntiGovernment Movie Draws Crowd," DetroitNews, May 11, 1995 (describing the reaction
of moviegoers to this film on Kahl's fight against the government).
255 Corcoran, supra note 38 at 45.
256 Id, at44.
257 Id, at 49.
258 Id, at 50 (describing the beliefs of this party as follows: the government is an extension
of the Christian Church; the Constitution is biblically derived; the federal income tax
must be abolished along with all social welfare programs and agencies; and the gold standard must be restored - all tenets of the Common Law).
259 Id, at 52 (quoting Kahl's letter).
260 Id, at 53.
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267 Id, at 55-56.
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269 Id, at 56.
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272 A condition of Kahl's parole was that he pay his taxes. The government's efforts to seize
Kahl were pursuant to a misdemeanor warrant issued for his arrest for violating parole.
Id, at 56-57. Law enforcement officers do not usually respond to misdemeanor warrants
with the doggedness displayed in Kahl's case [id, at 71-72] but Kahl was openly defiant
of State law and that usually generates a more serious response from the State.
273 Id, at 56-57, 71-72.
274 Id, at 93-100.
275 Id
276 Id, at 245-46.
277 Id, at 245.
278 Id, at 246.
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280 Id, at 252.
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282 Id, at 254.
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284 Id, at 255.
285 Almay, supranote 2; Columbus Dispatch, supra note 20.

286 On June 3, 1995, the anniversary of Kahl's death a Common Law grand jury convened
in Wichita, Kansas and "issued a 'Show Cause' order to President Clinton and Attorney
General Janet Reno calling for the abolition of the War & Emergency Powers Act of
1933." Militia Update, Klanwatch Intelligence Report at 6, August 1995.
287 Corcoran, supra note 38 at 255.
288 See Almay, supranote 2 (testifying to his belief that the community's commitment to its
law would "dissolve" as their laws inability to change the world became more apparent).
My point in the text is that it might dissolve into something else, something other than
violent rebellion or law.
289 Of course, the Internet may and apparently is used for other purposes, such as the call-

ing people to action in the physical world or the dissemination of information about the
Common Law that is used to support actual commitments in the physical world. See
Almay, supranote 2 (describing Internet use by this community as a means to disseminate information quickly); Heath, supra note 17 at 75 (describing how members use
Internet to post meetings).
290 Terra Libra printout (on file with author). Professor Cover's language was:
Now the natural understanding for a court confronting a gap between what is
affirmed as right and the world as perceived, is the world will be changed....
[Sometimes, however,] a reality...
cannot be brought to coincide with the
demand made upon it. [Then t]he risk.., is that the gulf between the redeemed
world and the unredeemed will be bridged not by our committed practical
behavior, but by our "inner life" - our spiritual and psychological realities.
Cover, supra note 4 at 209-210.
291 Id, at 210.
292

At the Terra Libra Freedom and Economic Power Seminar you will learn the
latest "Freedom Technology" for the practical means to live free and prosper in
an unfree world dedicated to destroying your freedom and wealth....
Dennis Lee ...will show you that the technology is available to make "free
electricity" out of thin air! And now YOU can become independent of the
energy monopolies.
David Friedman (University of Chicago Law School and a Ph.D. in physics)
will tell you "how Society Will be Revolutionized by New Technology." ...
Mark Lindsay (Terra Libras top psychologist) comes to you straight from our
"headquarters." He runs the Terra Libra Personal Power Institute....
Terra Libra, supra note 287. Of the 16 listed speakers, only two, Alfred Adask, the
publisher of Anti-Shyster, and Frank Kowalik, "arguably America's top tax freedom
expert, were slated to talk primarily about using the law to achieve freedom. Id
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294 Id
295 Cover, supra note 246.
296 Cover, supra note 48 at 45.
297 Cover, supra note 246.
298 Id
299 Professor Lawsons narrative forswears the power to dictate what anyone should do about
the world that his legal interpretation describes, one in which the Constitution has been
abandoned. Lawson, supranote 116 at 1253-1254 (pleading incompetence on the question of what should be done and asserting that "only the best of moral philosophers" can
explicate what, if any, action is dictated by the tale told therein). While I have already
explained that I consider Professor Lawson in "our" world and explained why [see, supra,
note 116] I am criticizing his work for suggesting, however inadvertently, some form of
"straddle." I assume that Professor Lawson took it for granted that no one would assume
that one legitimate response to the legal situation he describes is to "lock and load." Few
academics would consider that reaction. But that is exactly the error we make by ignor-

ing the alternate legal worlds around us and by failing to understand that those worlds
inevitably intersect with our own. I use Professor Lawson's work as an example of a larger problem. Most academics write as if legal interpretation was a game played by a selected few, known entities and all "harmless." I do not mean to suggest that he alone warrants criticism, quite the contrary. I also want to make dear that my criticism is that his
work shows too little commitment, not too much. I want him to tell us all more about
what he thinks, not less.
300 Michael Ryan, "Meaning and Alternity," Narrative, Violence and the Law: The Essays of
Robert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), p. 271.
301 See, e.g., Cover, supra note 246 at 1608, 1628:
If I have exhibited some sympathy for the victims of [a criminal court's] violence it is misleading. Very often the balance.., is just as I would want it.... If
it seems a nasty thought that death and pain are at the center of legal interpretation, so be it. It would not be better were there only a community of
argument, of readers and writers of texts, of interpreters.
302 Cover, supra note 48, at 68 [emphasis added].
303 How "our" law is being shaped by "theirs" is a subject onto itself. To cover it here would
swell this article to unreasonable proportions. For that reason I include only this brief reference to the subject and not because I consider it either simple or unimportant. I hope
to explore the court cases that reflect the confrontation between the Common Law and
official law in later work
304 See, e.g., Terpstra v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 759-761 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985) (discussing Common Law adherent's request to be assisted at trial by other
Common Law adherents in lieu of one of 'our" lawyers); Braun, supranote 22 (describing increasing frequency of criminal charges for unauthorized practice of law being filed
against Common Law adherents).
305 See, supra, note 31.
306 In United States v. Kaun, 633 F.Supp. 406, 418 (E.D. Wisc 1986), the district court
enjoined Mr. Kaun, inter alia, from: organizing any entity or promoting any plan based
upon "(a) the false representation that wages ... are exempt from federal income taxation, or (b) any other such frivolous claim with respect to the scope of federal income
taxation;" "[a]dvertising, marketing or selling any documents" that made such claims
about income taxation; "[f]iling ... Freedom of Information requests with the Internal
Revenue Service;" or "[filing ... or prosecut[ing] ... any civil action in any court in the
United States..." based on such claims about income taxation. This is truly an injunction of remarkable scope. Moreover, its scope was supported by references to the potential breadth and power of the movement with which Mr. Kaun was apparently associated, the Common Law movement. Id, at 411-412 (discussing the Kaun group's association with other groups and noting that members of Kauns group were required to attend
sessions on constitutional law and other legal subjects).
This injunction was upheld by the Seventh Circuit, although the Court first 'narrowly" interpreted some of its parts. United States v. Kaun, 827 E2d 1144 (7th Cir.
1987). The "narrowing" process did not dramatically curtail the injunctions scope. For
example, the court made it clear Kaun could attend meetings with other tax protesters

and "share his general beliefs" without violating the injunction. Id, at 1152. The injunction, however, would be violated "if... Kaun actually persuaded others, directly or indirectly, to violate the tax laws, or if...
Kaun's words and actions were directed toward such
persuasion in a situation where the unlawful conduct was imminently likely to occur."
Id, at 1151. The other "narrow" readings offered by the Seventh Circuit were as "narrow" as that one. After such narrowing, the Court found the injunction was not vague
or overbroad. Id, at 1153.
307 United States v.Schneider, 910 F2d 1569 (7th Cir. 1990).
308 910 F.2d at 1570.
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311 Id, at 1571.
312 See also Kaun,633 F.Supp. at 411-12 (emphasizing the scope of the legal movement of
which the defendant was a part as implicit justification for granting injunction, which
severely restricted the words the defendant could speak, his organizational activities and
his petitioning activities).
313 The Seventh Circuit also considered whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when the court refused to allow his lawyer to withdraw due to irreconcilable differences with his client. The client wanted the lawyer to argue in his defense
that as a Sovereign Citizen he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts,
the lawyer refused. The Seventh Circuit held that because no "reputable lawyer could
have been found to persuade the judge" to admit this defense that "has no conceivable
validity in American law," the Common Law adherent was not harmed by the judge's
refusal to allow his counsel to withdraw. Id, at 1570. "He wanted a lawyer who does not,
or at least should not, exist." Id This part of the holding demonstrates again how courts
are interpreting precepts on who may practice law and how as well as the 6th
Amendments guarantee of counsel to shut this law down.
314 That case is not the only example of the criminal law and process being stretched to help
shut down the Common Law nomos. See, e.g., Heath, supra note 17 at 75 (describing
prosecution in Montana of Common Law adherents for criminal syndicalism on the
ground that the group advocated violence for political purpose and reporting that one
Common Law adherent was sentenced to 10 years, others to smaller sentences); Braun,
supra note 22 (describing raid of Common Law adherent's office in Florida and seizure
of his court files and two computers in investigation for charge of unauthorized practice
of law).
315 The Wisconsin legislature is considering legislation that would make it a felony to simulate legal process. 1995 Wis. Sen. Bill 437 (on file with author).
316 In his first published work, Professor Cover condemned the Vietnam war as a "genocidal horror." See Robert M. Cover, "Book Review" of Atrocious Judges: Lives ofJudges
Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments of Oppression, by Richard Hildreth (1856), 68
Columbia Law Review 1003, 1005 (1968). He urged judges to resign, to engage in creative legal interpretation to protect resisters or "simply [to] refuse to follow law or authority and set resisters free." Id, at 1006-07.
317 Robert M. Cover, "Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order," 5 Journal

Law andReligion 65, 73-74 (1987).
318 As one of his students I can attest that Bob's commitments were clearly expressed in class.
He did not mask his commitments, nor did he try to pawn them off as uncontestable.
He labeled them as "his" commitments and encouraged us to make our own. He did,
however, encourage us to make some, to take up the responsibility for building law that
might bring a better world.
319 I, for one, paid no attention to the tractors that rolled into Washington, D.C. to
protest peacefully the farm crisis in our country. Apparently, the failure of that effort
helped fuel the Common Law alternative. Conversation with Susan Hansen, reporter
for the American Lawyer, March 4, 1996 (relating that Mr. Schroder, a leading figure
in this movement, sees the failure of the tractor protest as a pivotal moment in this
law's development).

